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The growing popularity of arbitration agreements is well-
documented.  The academic literature on these agreements has 
been largely critical, arguing that they jeopardize important 
rights and enable employers to take unfair advantage of employees 
and consumers.  However, standard economic analysis suggests 
that since these agreements are freely negotiated, they presumably 
increase the utility of both parties and are therefore efficient.  This 
Article raises questions about the efficiency of such agreements in 
the employment context.  It begins by modeling the decision-
making process by which a rational employee would judge the 
desirability of an agreement, both after and before a dispute has 
arisen.  The model demonstrates that no employee can, in reality, 
have the information necessary to make a rational economic 
judgment about a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.  In the 
absence of information, systematic behavioral heuristics will lead 
employees to overlook or misjudge the costs and benefits of such 
agreements.  Given that employees are not signing these 
agreements on the basis of rational economic analysis, the Article 
considers possible arguments that the agreements might still 
increase societal efficiency.  Ultimately, it concludes that 
proponents of pre-dispute agreements need to provide stronger 
evidence of such efficiencies.  In the meantime, courts, legislators, 
and commentators should focus more on the decisionmaking 





These days it is hard to escape from arbitration agreements.  
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(FAA)1 in 1925 to ensure that states would enforce arbitration 
agreements.2  However, in the 1990s the use of arbitration in 
consumer and employment contracts exploded.3   Such agreements 
generally require that parties bring any common law or statutory 
claims arising out of the relationship to arbitration, rather than 
litigating such claims in court. 
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,4 the Supreme Court 
resolved any lingering questions about the per se enforceability of 
arbitration agreements in the employment context.  In the 1991 case 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Inc.,5 the Court had held that the 
FAA required the enforcement of an arbitration agreement between a 
securities analyst and his employer, even as to the analysts claim of 
age discrimination.6  However, the arbitration agreement in that case 
was in a securities registration application, and the Court had not 
resolved whether the FAA applied to agreements set forth in 
employment contracts.7   In Circuit City the Court held that the FAA 
required enforcement of arbitration agreements between almost all 
employers and employees, with the sole exception of employees 
                                                        
1 9 U.S.C. §§ 116 (2000). 
2 See id. § 2 (A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.). 
3 See Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of 
Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 449-50 (2004) 
(discussing the explosive growth of arbitration cases administered by such 
arbitration groups as American Arbitration Association, National 
Arbitration Forum, and Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc.). 
4 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
5 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
6 See id. at 26-27. 
7 See id. at 25 n.2.  Section 1 of the FAA provides that nothing herein 
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce.  9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).  The court declined to address the scope of 
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directly involved in interstate transportation.8  Perhaps ironically, 
however, Circuit City did not end up prevailing in its own landmark 
decision: the Ninth Circuit held on remand that the arbitration 
agreement was substantively and procedurally unconscionable and 
denied enforcement.9 
 The history of the Circuit City case highlights an important 
shift in the discussion about employment arbitration agreements.  
Initially following Gilmer, commentators criticized the premise that 
employment arbitration agreements should be enforceable per se.10  A 
flurry of articles in the mid-1990s attacked the Gilmer premise that 
arbitration could ever provide relief for violations of federal statutory 
rights, particularly anti-discrimination rights.11  However, the 
Courts analysis in Gilmer and Circuit City found that the FAA 
requires the enforcement of almost all arbitration agreements.  The 
Court noted that the purpose of the FAA was to place arbitration 
agreements on the same footing as other contracts.12  Since the 
                                                        
8 See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.  The Court held that section 1 of the FAA 
applied only to contracts of employment of transportation workers  
namely, those workers actually engaged in the movement of goods in 
interstate commerce.  Id. at 112 (citation omitted).  The purpose of this 
exclusion is somewhat unclear; as the Court noted in Circuit City, the 
legislative history of § 1 is quite sparse.  Id. at 119. 
9 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
122 S.Ct. 2329 (2002). 
10 See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case against 
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and 
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 453 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, 
Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog 
Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENVER U. L. REV. 1017, 1019 (1996). 
11 See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights Waived 
and Lost in the Arbitral Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 384 (1996); Joseph R. 
Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy 
in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOF. LAB. L.J. 1, 52-53 (1996); Sharona Hoffman, 
Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute Resolution or Coercive Dispute 
Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 131, 135 (1996); Stone, supra note 
ST1, at 1020. 
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parties had made an agreement to arbitrate, they should be held to 
it.13 
The contract paradigm that has been applied to arbitration 
agreements does not require, however, that every such agreement 
must be enforced.  As the Court noted in Gilmer, an agreement to 
arbitrate may be unenforceable if such agreement resulted from the 
sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide 
grounds for the revocation of any contract.14  Thus, state and federal 
courts are grappling with common-law contract doctrines as applied 
to particular employment arbitration agreements, with results such 
as the ultimate one in Circuit City finding the agreement 
unconscionable.15 
 The cornerstone presumption of contract law is that contracts 
are entered into freely by individuals who expect the contract to 
enhance their individual utility.  Since rational actors would only 
agree to a contract if they believe it will make them better off, society 
can presume that each contract will enhance overall social welfare.16  
If these presumptions did not hold true in the context of employment 
arbitration agreements, then a central justification for their 
enforcement would be inapplicable.  We must therefore ask: why are 
employees and employers making these agreements?  Are these 
agreements being formed because each side believes it will be better 
off? 
 Using traditional law and economics models, influential 
commentators have argued that this must be the case.  Simply stated, 
these scholars have found that arbitration agreements increase 
overall efficiency by allowing the parties to choose a more efficient 
method of dispute resolution.17  The purpose of this Article is to 
                                                        
13 Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
14 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi Motor, 473 U.S. at 627). 
15 See Adams, 279 F.3d at 892; see also Alexander v. Anthony Intl, 341 F.3d 
256 (3d Cir. 2003);  Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 
2003); Brasington v. EMC Corp., 855 So.2d 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
16 See RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & IAN AYRES, CONTRACT LAW 470 (6th ed. 2003). 
17 See Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An 
Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 212-13 (2000); Steven Shavell, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 
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question this conclusion.  In examining the law and economics of 
these agreements, I start by unpacking the considerations that go into 
the making of the agreement itself.  I hope to show how economically 
rational employees and employers might go about making such 
decisions by creating a model of this decisionmaking process.  This 
model sets forth the many factors that an employee would need to 
know in order to make a rational economic decision about an 
arbitration agreement.  The model also incorporates recent 
developments in the field of behavioral law and economics 
concerning systematic irrationalities that may influence the process.  
By creating a picture of the actual decision to sign such agreements, I 
endeavor to establish a new starting point for debates about the 
wisdom of their enforceability. 
Part I establishes the basic economic model for agreements to 
arbitrate employment claims.  I begin with a model for arbitration 
agreements that are executed after the claim has arisen, also know as 
post-dispute arbitration agreements.  After developing this model, I 
use it as the basis for the more complicated model for signing an 
agreement at the beginning of the employment relationship  a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement.  As the model will demonstrate, the 
information necessary to determine the efficiency of a pre-dispute 
agreement is likely to be unavailable to employees who contemplate 
such agreements.  Faced with this dilemma, employees may fall back 
onto decisionmaking shortcuts, known as heuristics, which may lead 
them to an inefficient result.  Thus, the cost-benefit analysis that 
employees can make about a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate is 
more likely to be accurate, and thus more likely to produce an 
efficient result, than the analysis that employees can make about a 
pre-dispute agreement.. 
Part II therefore considers whether pre-dispute employment 
arbitration agreements might still be efficient despite the 
                                                                                                                                  
efficient shall mean the result that provides for the greatest overall social 
utility.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-16 (6th ed. 
2002). I differentiate general efficiency from Pareto efficiency in the usual 
manner: an efficient result is one in which the parties are better off overall, 
although an individual party may be worse off, whereas all parties are 
better off when a result is Pareto efficient.  See id. at 12-14 (comparing Pareto 
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informational deficiencies that underlie them.  One possibility is that 
pre-dispute agreements provide some additional benefit by locking 
the parties in before the dispute has arisen.  Another possibility is 
that employees will irrationally refrain from entering arbitration 
agreements after a dispute has arisen.  One final possibility is that 
pre-dispute agreements are more efficient because they reduce 
externalities such as judicial administration costs.  Part III then 




I.  MODELING THE DECISION TO ARBITRATE 
 
 Free exchange is the cornerstone of capitalism.  Exchange is 
what allows individuals to maximize their utility: individuals can 
specialize in producing one good or service but then acquire the 
panoply of other necessities through purchase or trade.  Freedom of 
exchange through contract is the cornerstone of our commercial legal 
regime.  The general rule in contracts is that people are free to agree 
to just about any type of exchange and have those agreements 
enforced in a court of law. 18  The theory behind freedom of contract 
is simple: parties will come to an agreement only if they believe that 
it is in their best interests to do so.  Given that both parties think the 
agreement will improve their utility, people should be permitted to 
make such agreements and have them enforced in the future.19  Of 
course, some parties will change their mind about the costs and 
benefits of the bargain as the agreement plays out.  Markets may 
                                                        
18 Some exceptions to this general rule include contracts to commit a crime, 
see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1978), surrogacy 
contracts, see Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1250 (N.J. 1988), and waivers 
of certain statutory rights, see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Inc., 415 U.S. 
36, 51-52 (1974). 
19 See, e.g., Eric Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the 
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom 
to Contract, 24 J. LEG. STUD. 283, 284 (1995) (In the area of contract law, the 
efficiency argument concludes that courts should enforce all voluntary 
contracts that do not produce negative externalities, regardless of their 
distributive consequences. If a contract is voluntary, then it presumptively 
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crash, and personal circumstances may change.  However, since 
parties would not waste the effort to make agreements that would 
not be enforced, everyone is better off under a system of contractual 
enforcement.20 
 Although freedom of contract is essential to our economic 
system, economic theory recognizes that freely formed contracts will 
not always be efficient.  If parties knew exactly what the outcome of 
each contract would be, they would know the costs and benefits and 
would be able to determine the relative efficiency.  But parties do not 
always have perfect information, and parties may sometime be 
mistaken about the effects that a contract will have on their social 
utility.  The most obvious example is fraud: when one parties 
contracts to buy an authentic antique, his utility will be reduced if 
that antique is later discovered as a clever knockoff.21  But parties 
often contract with incomplete and incorrect information, and they 
may not always choose an outcome which improves their utility.  
While contract law has delineated some such agreements as 
unenforceable,22 there is no general principle that only efficient 
agreements will be enforced.  Instead, our system presumes that 
parties will act rationally and will have sufficient information to 
make generally efficient decisions.23 
 However, as economists recognize, parties do not always 
have sufficient information.  In fact, it is sometime rational not to 
have such information: for example, when the costs of obtaining this 
information would outweigh the benefits derived from it.24  If we 
know that a certain type of contract will require information that will 
be systematically too costly to obtain, we may question whether such 
contracts actually do increase societal efficiency.  We can obtain 
insight into this possibility by modeling the actual decision made by 
parties to such a contract.  What follows are efforts to model of the 
                                                        
20 For a discussion of other potential justifications for contract, see Randy 
Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 271-91 (1986). 
21 See POSNER, supra note P1, at 110. 
22 For example, contract law allows parties to void some agreements on the 
basis of mistake.  See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 9.1 9.4 (3d ed. 
1999). 
23 See POSNER, supra note P1, at 4. 
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decisionmaking process that goes into decisions to arbitrate or 
litigate, both before and after disputes have arisen.  I begin with the 
simpler model: the decision to arbitrate or litigate after the dispute 
has arisen. 
 
A.  The Cost-Benefit Analysis behind the Post-Dispute Arbitration 
Agreement 
 In our system of dispute resolution, litigation is the default 
rule  namely, the result that will take place unless the parties agree 
to a different alternative.  One possible alternative to litigation is 
arbitration.25  The decision to take a legal dispute to arbitration, 
rather than the court system, is presumptively one that a party will 
make only if he or she will be better off in arbitration.  This decision 
can be made simply by weighing the costs and benefits of both 
options. 
The potential benefits of litigation, at least to the party 
bringing the suit, are the expected relief that will be granted minus 
the costs of bringing the suit in the first place.  The expected relief is 
the value of the likely damages (and other relief) discounted by the 
probability that the party will win the suit.  The cost-benefit analysis 
of such a decision could thus be expressed as: 
 
P*R  C 
 
where P is the probability of success, R is the value of the expected 
relief, and C is the cost of bringing the suit (attorneys fees, court 
costs, etc.).26  By conducting the analysis for both arbitration and 
                                                        
25 For purposes of this paper, arbitration means a method of dispute 
resolution in which the parties present their case to an arbitrator or 
arbitrators, who then issue a decision on the case.  Interestingly, there is no 
definition of arbitration in the Federal Arbitration Act.  See 9 U.S.C §§ 1  16 
(2000). 
26 This litigation model is based on models developed and used in seminal 
law and economics articles.  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note P1, at 567-71; 
Hylton, supra note H1, at 218-29; Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our 
Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get Litigated?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265 (2002); 
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Dispute for Litigation, 13 J. 
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litigation, an employee could determine which alternative offered the 
most utility by determining which provided the higher value.  Thus, 
the decision to choose arbitration over litigation could be expressed 
as: 
Pa*Ra  Ca > Pl*Rl - Cl  
 
An example of such a calculation might go as follows: Employee 
Amy has a claim against her employer.  She knows that if she took 
the claim to litigation, she would have a 70 percent chance of 
winning an average award of $10,000.  But she knows that her costs, 
including attorneys fees, be $3000.  If she chose arbitration, she 
knows she would only have a 60 percent chance of winning $8,000.  
However, her costs would only be $500.  Since the net expected 
utility of arbitration would be (0.7 * $10000)  $3000, or $4000, and the 
net expected value of arbitration would be (0.6 * $8000)  $500, or 
$4300, Amy would choose arbitration.  Amys employer AA Co. 
would conduct the same cost-benefit analysis, except that (a) it 
would be trying to minimize its losses, rather than maximize gains, 
and (b) its costs for both litigation and arbitration would be different.  
Thus, if AA Co. has costs of $1000 for litigation and $500 for 
arbitration, the net expected value of litigation would be calculated 
as (0.7 * -$10000)  1000, or -$8000, and the net expected value of 
arbitration would be (0.6 * -$8000)  500, or -$5300. 27  AA Co. would 
also choose arbitration. 
 Obviously, this cost-benefit analysis is a simplified version of 
a much more complicated assessment of litigation and arbitration 
outcomes.28  But the factors discussed above are the basic factors by 
                                                                                                                                  
also includes various non-direct costs, such as the cost of publicity if the suit 
is litigated.  In the examples I provide, I will assume such costs are zero. 
27 For purposes of this model, I assume both parties have perfect 
information about the plaintiffs likelihood of success and the potential for 
relief.  Many litigation models assume that the parties will have different 
expectations about their likelihood of success.  The possibility for such 
divergence is discussed later in this section.  
28 For example, the probability of success and expected relief factors could 
encompass a variety of possibilities: a 40 percent chance of getting nothing, 
a 20 percent chance of getting $10,000, a 20 percent chance of getting 
$30,000, a 15 percent chance of getting $60,000, a 4 percent chance of getting 
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which the parties would make their assessments about choice of 
forum.  Moreover, if we can make certain assumptions about those 
factors, we can make certain predictions about how the parties will 
behave.  For example, if we assume that: (1) litigation will always 
have a higher expected relief (P * R) than arbitration for the 
employee, and (2) costs for arbitration will always be lower for both 
sides than will costs for litigation, then a rational employer will 
always choose arbitration over litigation.29  Moreover, if we make the 
same assumptions, an employee will choose arbitration if the 
difference in costs between arbitration and litigation is greater than 
the difference in expected relief between litigation and arbitration.  In 
the example above, the difference in costs for the employee was 
$3000 - $500, or $2500, which is greater than the difference between 
(0.7 * 10000) and (0.6 * 8000), which would be $2200.30 
 Although the two assumptions discussed above perhaps 
represent the conventional wisdom on the subject, we cannot say 
empirically that they are true.  Proponents of arbitration would argue 
with the assumption that the employee always has a higher expected 
relief in litigation than arbitration.31  Arbitrators should be no more 
biased against employees than juries, they would argue, and an 
arbitral award might have a higher expected value, since it would be 
granted more quickly than a litigation award.32  However, opponents 
of arbitration would argue that litigation costs will not necessarily be 
higher than arbitration costs, especially given the need to pay for the 
                                                        
29 Expressed as an equation, since (Pa * Ra) < (Pl * Rl), and Ca < Cl, and an 
employer is seeking to reduce its costs, it will always choose arbitration. 
30 Again, this calculation could be expressed as follows: the employee will 
choose arbitration if: 
Cl  Ca > (Pl * Rl)  (Pa * Ra) 
31 See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over 
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
559, 564 (2001). 
32 A recent study of employment arbitration and litigation amongst higher-
paid employees found no statistically significant differences between 
employee win rates or award levels in arbitration and litigation.  Theodore 
Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An 
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arbitrators themselves.33  This paper makes to effort to ascertain 
whether arbitration is generally more or less fair, or more or less 
expensive.  My point here is that economically rational employers 
and employees would calculate the costs and benefits of an 
arbitration agreement before deciding to sign, and would only 
execute the agreement if the benefits outweigh the costs. 
 In the hypothetical above, the decision to choose arbitration 
over litigation is efficient for both Amy and AA Co., leading them 
both to choose it independently.  What if arbitration was a better deal 
for the employer, but the employee expected a better result from 
litigation?  If they have perfect knowledge, we would still expect that 
the parties would choose the forum that provides the greatest utility 
for both parties as a whole.  As the Coase Theorem teaches us, the 
initial assignment of rights  in this example, the right of the 
employee to choose litigation  should not stand in the way of 
arbitration if arbitration is the more efficient result.34  If the parties 
have perfect information and can freely bargain, then the employer 
would bargain with the employee to choose arbitration.  Although 
arbitration, standing alone, would make the employee worse off than 
litigation, the employer would compensate the employee sufficiently 
so that the employee would find it more advantageous to choose 
                                                        
33 A recent report by Public Citizen found no evidence that arbitration 
reduces the overall transaction costs of litigation.  See Public Citizen, The 
Costs of Arbitration, May 10, 2002, available at: 
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7173. 
34 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 
CORNELL L. REV. 783, 783 (1990) (discussing Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 5-7 (1960)).  The Coase Theorem has been the 
subject of intense academic discussion and debate as to its meaning and 
validity.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The 
Ironic History of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 398 (1997) (arguing 
that Coase never believed his Theorem applied to the real world); Stephen 
G. Medema, Through a Glass Darkly or Just Wearing Dark Glasses?  Posin, 
Coase, and the Coase Theorem, 62 TENN. L. REV. 1041, 1041 n.4 (1995) (citing 
attempts to prove, disprove, confirm or refute the Coase Theorem); Daniel 
Q. Posin, The Coase Theorem: Through a Glass Darkly, 61 TENN. L. REV. 797, 
799 (1994) (arguing that the Coase Theorem is in error).  Although I do not 
wish to wade into this debate, the Theorem seems like straightforward sense 
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arbitration.  Ultimately, the parties would agree to whichever 
outcome would be more efficient overall.35 
In order to model this process, we need to compare the 
employees cost-benefit analysis with the employers cost benefit 
analysis.  When calculating combined utility for the two parties, we 
would compare the joint utilities of arbitration with the joint utilities 
of litigation.  Thus, the parties would choose arbitration if: 
 
(Pa * Ra)  Ca(ee) + (Pa * -Ra)  Ca(er) > (Pl * Rl)  Cl(ee) + (Pl * -Rl)  Cl(er) 
Interestingly, the expected relief (P * R) drops out of the equation, 
since the value of the expected relief is the same for both parties, but 
is a benefit for the employee (P * R) and a cost for the employer (P * -
R).  Thus, the calculation could be more simply expressed as 
arbitration will be chosen if: 
 
 Ca(ee)  Ca(er) >  Cl(ee)  Cl(er)36 
In other words, the parties would choose arbitration if the joint costs 
of taking the claim to arbitration are less than the joint costs of taking 
the claim to litigation. 
 This determination is significant, because if the costs for both 
parties are always less in one forum than the other  say, arbitration, 
then arbitration will always be the most efficient outcome.  And 
therefore, if the employer and employee have perfect knowledge and 
can bargain, they will always choose arbitration, no matter how 
much more favorable arbitration is to one party.  As an example, 
imagine a situation where the arbitration is heavily stacked in favor 
of the employer.  Employee Bob has a claim that has a 90 percent 
chance of earning him $100,000 in litigation, but only a 10 percent 
chance of earning him $20,000 in arbitration.  His costs in litigation 
would be $400, and his costs in arbitration would be $500.37  Bob 
                                                        
35 Cf. Hylton, supra not H1, at 212 n.5 ([A]mong informed parties the 
incentive to waive the right to litigate is observed when and only when 
litigation reduces societys social wealth.). 
36 This equation could also be represented as: 
Arbitration is chosen if:   Ca(ee)  + Ca(er) < Cl(ee) + Cl(er 
37 I set litigation costs as lower than arbitration costs to weight Bobs 
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would readily choose litigation after making the following cost 
benefit analysis: 
 
(0.1 * $20000)  $500 = $1500 < (0.9 * $100000)  $400 = $89600 
 
In comparing the possible outcomes of arbitration and litigation, the 
employer BB Inc. faces the same probability of loss as Bob does for 
gain: namely, a 90 percent chance of losing $100,000 in litigation, but 
only a 10 percent chance of losing $20,000 in arbitration.  However, 
lets assume that BB Inc. has costs of $2000 in litigation and $500 in 
arbitration.  Thus, BB Inc. would want to pursue arbitration based on 
the following analysis: 
 
(0.1 * -$20000) - $500 = -$2500 > (0.9 * -$100000) - $2000 = -$92000 
 
As discussed above, joint utility is calculated solely based on the 
costs of both methods, since the expected returns for both sides 
cancel each other out.38  The following equation illustrates that 
arbitration has a higher joint utility than litigation: 
 
 Ca(ee) ($500)  Ca(er) ($500) = -$1000 >   Cl(ee) ($400)  Cl(er) ($2000) = 
 -$2400 
 
Arbitration will save the parties $1400 in joint efficiency. 
How would the employer convince the employee to take the 
case to arbitration?  BB Inc. would have to pay Bob the difference in 
utility.  Since litigation has a greater utility of $88,100 for Bob, but 
arbitration has a greater utility of $89,500 for BB Inc., both parties 
would be better off if BB Inc. paid Bob between $88,100 and 
$89,499.99 to take the case to arbitration.  If the employer paid, say, 
$89,000 to the employee, Bobs calculation would be: 
 
(0.1 * $20000)  $500 + $89,000 = $90,500 (arb) > (0.9 * $100000)  $400 
= $89,600 (lit) 
                                                        
38 The $90,000 expected return to the employee through litigation is an 
expected $90,000 loss to the employer, while expected the $2000 expected 
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while BB Inc.s calculation would be: 
 
(0.1 * -$20000) - $500 - $89,000 = -$91,500 (arb) > (0.9 * -$100000) - 
$2000 = -$92,000 (lit) 
 
Thus, both parties would agree to arbitrate.  They would split the 
efficiency surplus: Bob would receive $900 of the surplus, and BB Inc. 
would receive $500 of it. 
 Thus, if the parties have perfect information and can freely 
bargain, they will always choose the method of dispute resolution 
that has the lowest total cost for both sides.  In our example above, 
arbitration represented a double hit for employee Bob: not only was 
his expected reward much greater in litigation than in arbitration, but 
his costs were higher in arbitration as well.  However, since BB Inc.s 
costs were significantly higher in litigation than in arbitration, it was 
more efficient for the parties to choose arbitration.  In order to 
persuade Bob to choose this route, however, BB Inc. needs to pay him 
the difference from the surplus that arbitration generated for it.  Even 
after paying this large sum, BB Inc. would still be better off than it 
would have been going to litigation.39 
 Of course, if the parties had perfect information about the 
expected value of the claim, they would be able to settle the claim 
and avoid incurring dispute resolution costs entirely.40  Litigation is a 
response to uncertainty  uncertainty about the chance of victory, the 
potential award, and the costs of litigating.  Parties may not settle if 
they do not agree upon the basic components of the decision to settle: 
                                                        
39 Note that this payment is only necessary because the employee has a right 
to take the case to litigation, and therefore has a veto over arbitration.  If 
arbitration was the societal default, the parties would choose arbitration 
without any exchange of funds. 
40 See POSNER, supra not P1, at 567 (That cases are ever litigated rather than 
settled might appear to violate the principle that when transaction costs are 
low, parties will voluntarily transact if a mutually beneficial transaction is 
possible.); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to 
Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 112 
(1994) (As long as the costs of trial are higher than the costs of settlement, 
and as long as both sides make an identical estimate of the likely outcome of 
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the probability the plaintiff will win, the expected value of the 
plaintiffs relief, and the costs incurred by both sides in litigating.41  
Since all of these components are predictions, parties will have 
different sets of predictions.  The same holds true for the decision to 
choose arbitration instead of litigation.  Once parties have failed to 
settle their claim, they may then make a decision about whether to 
take the claim to arbitration.  If the parties both have perfect 
information about these various factors, and can then bargain over 
which outcome to choose, they will reach the most efficient result.  
But if the parties base their decision on different sets of information, 
then they may not come to the efficient conclusion.  They may either 
fail to agree on the most efficient outcome, or they may both agree to 
the less efficient outcome.42  Again, an example may best illustrate 
this. 
  As discussed above, both employee and employer would 
choose arbitration under the following scenario: Employee Amy has 
a 70 percent chance of winning an average award of $10,000, with 
costs of $3000, in litigation, while under she would have a 60 percent 
chance of winning $8,000, with costs of $500.  Since the net expected 
utility of arbitration would be (0.7 * $10000)  $3000, or $4000, and the 
net expected value of arbitration would be (0.6 * $8000)  $500, or 
$4300, Amy should choose arbitration.  However, let us suppose that 
Amy has information which leads her to calculate the expected 
benefits of litigation and arbitration incorrectly .  For example, Amy 
may believe that she has a 90 percent chance of winning $20,000 in 
litigation, but only a 40 percent chance of winning $5,000 in 
arbitration.  Even with perfect information about costs, Amy would 
make the incorrect decision to litigate the case, since her (incorrect) 
                                                        
41 See POSNER, supra note P1, at 568 (Settlement might appear especially 
unlikely if the parties, by virtue of having different information about the 
strength of their respective cases, do not agree on the likely outcome of the 
litigation.). 
42 In settlement negotiations, settling the case will always be the more 
efficient choice, since settlement costs will always be less than litigation 
costs.  However, in choosing between arbitration and litigation, the parties 
may determine that litigation actually costs less than arbitration.  Thus, a 
failure to reach an agreement to arbitrate will not always lead to an 
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expected benefit of litigation (0.9 * $20000  $3000 = $15,000) would 
be much higher than her (incorrect) expected benefit of arbitration 
(0.4 * $5000  $500 = $1500). AA Co. would be unwilling to pay Amy 
the $13,500 necessary to convince her to arbitrate,43 and therefore 
Amy would inefficiently take the case to court. 
 As in all cost-benefit analyses, information is crucial to 
determining whether to arbitrate or litigate.  Thus, the relative 
efficiency of parties decisions to litigate or arbitrate will depend on 
how closely their information about those two processes, and their 
predictions based on that information, resemble the reality of the 
situation.  If parties consistently make poor predictions based on 
incorrect assumptions about the differences between the two forums, 
then parties may make consistently inefficient decisions.  For 
example, as illustrated in the hypothetical above, if employees 
consistently overestimate their potential for litigation success, but 
underestimate their potential for arbitral success, they may 
inefficiently choose litigation over arbitration. 
 Based on our cost benefit model, we can draw several 
conclusions about potential agreements to arbitrate employment 
claims after those claims have arisen.  First, the forum with the lower 
costs will be the more efficient choice.  Second, if the parties have 
perfect information about the probability of success, expected relief, 
and costs in each forum with respect to the claim at issue, they will 
bargain to reach the most efficient outcome.  Third, if parties do not 
have perfect information, they may end up in the less efficient forum.   
 
B.  The Cost-Benefit Analysis behind the Pre-Dispute Arbitration 
Agreement 
 Thus far we have been modeling the decision to arbitrate or 
litigate after the employees dispute has arisen.  However, pre-
dispute employment arbitration agreements are signed at the 
beginning of employment, well before any disputes have arisen.  
                                                        
43 In the case discussed above involving Amy, we said that AA Co. had costs 
of $1000 for litigation and $500 for arbitration, and thus the net expected 
value of litigation for the employer would be calculated as (0.7 * -$10000)  
1000, or -$8000, and the net expected value of arbitration would be (0.6 * -
$8000)  500, or -$5300.  Thus, the employer would only be willing to pay A 
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Although the types of claims covered by a particular agreement is 
left up to the parties, a standard scope of coverage is all claims 
arising from the course of employment, including common law 
claims as well as state and federal statutory claims.44  In order to 
determine whether it is more efficient to assign all of these claims to 
arbitration, both employers and employees will want to know the 
same type of information as in the post-dispute context: their 
probability of success in arbitration and litigation, their expected 
gains (or losses) from both forums, and their costs in both forums.  
There is, of course, one major difference.  In the post-dispute context, 
the parties know exactly what the dispute is about, and therefore 
what the legal claim will be.  In the pre-dispute context, the parties 
will have to make another prediction: the types and the likelihood of 
the different claims that could arise during the employment 
relationship.  Moreover, employees are often asked to sign a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement as a condition of employment.  That 
means that employees must weigh the costs and benefits of this 
agreement against another factor: the costs and benefits of taking this 
job, as opposed to a different job that may or may not require a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement.  The employee is not deciding the 
merits of arbitration versus litigation as a stand-alone proposition; 
instead, such a comparison must then be weighed against the costs 
and benefits of this job as opposed to other potential jobs.  The 
calculations are much more complicated. 
 As in the post-dispute context, an employees decision to sign 
a pre-dispute agreement will be based on the probability of success, 
the expected relief, and the costs of arbitration as compared with the 
probability of success, the expected relief, and the costs of litigation.  
We expressed this model in the post-dispute context as: 
 
Pa*Ra  Ca compared with Pl*Rl - Cl 
 
However, rather than considering this with respect to one dispute 
with ascertained facts and a cause (or causes) of action, the employee 
must make the decision as to the potential likely causes of action that 
may arise during her employment.  To be even more precise, the 
                                                        
44 This model assumes that the claims at issue are those brought by an 
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employee must predict the myriad possibilities of different factual 
scenarios involving employment law claims.  After all, potential 
employment claims can vary widely in their expected likelihood of 
success, their relief, and their costs of litigation.45 
 How do we go about modeling this?  In the post-dispute 
context, the calculation was much simpler: take the probability of 
success, expected relief, and probable costs of the action that has 
already arisen.  For example, in a potential Title VII case, the 
employee would ask: given what happened, what are my chances of 
success?  Is my case based on statistical data, or is there a smoking 
gun proving direct discrimination?  The expected relief is also 
possible to calculate.  Did the employee lose wages?  Did the 
employee suffer personal pain, humiliation, and suffering?  Are 
punitive damages a possibility?  Again, employees and their 
attorneys can work through the Kolstad factors46 to determine 
whether they have a valid claim for punitive damages, and whether 
the arbitration forum will accept punitive damages claims.  Costs are 
also possible to calculate.  What is the complexity of the case?  What 
is the evidence that each side has?  Predictions about these matters 
can be based on an actual situation.  The fact that most parties settle 
supports the inference that parties can make rational calculations on 
these matters.47 
 Consider, now, these calculations from the perspective of a 
prospective employee.  Overall, the employee will be attempting to 
                                                        
45 This is true even if you limit the potential claims to a particular cause of 
action.  For example, the expected relief would be much lower in a 
statistically-based failure-to-promote Title VII case than would a Title VII 
case involving termination for failure to accede to a sexual quid pro quo. 
46 In Kolstad v. Am.Dental Assn, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1994), the Supreme Court 
set forth factors to be considered when making a punitive damages 
determination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
47 Most estimates find that between eighty-five and ninety-five percent of 
cases are resolved before trial.  See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases 
Settle: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 
1339-40 (1994).  Galanter and Cahill observe, however, that many of these 
cases are resolved through judicial decisions on important or dispositive 
motions, or even through arbitration.  They argue that two-thirds is a better 
estimate of the number of cases that settle voluntarily (i.e., without a 
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determine the difference in value between taking claims to 
arbitration and taking claims to litigation.  But how would an 
employee go about figuring that out?  One possibility would be to 
rely on statistics about the overall difference between arbitration 
outcomes and litigation outcomes.  Such statistics are not readily 
available.  But even if they were, they would only be a crude 
approximation, for a number of reasons.  First, settlements are not 
included in the statistics.  Employees who do not sign pre-dispute 
agreements may be in a position to achieve more lucrative 
settlements than those who sign arbitration agreements.  And since 
such settlements are generally confidential, it is impossible to get a 
sense of the difference.  Second, national averages are at best a rough 
approximation of the costs and benefits to this particular employee 
working at this particular firm.  Since parties are given the freedom 
to craft their own rules and procedures for the arbitral forum, the 
employee would have to assess the system of rules and procedures 
offered by this employer against the rules and procedures generally 
used in other arbitrations.  Even if arbitration results are roughly 
comparable to litigation results at the national level, this employers 
arbitration system may have results that differ widely from the 
national average. 
 However, the most crucial difference in the pre-dispute 
context is that the employee has to factor in a new variable: the 
likelihood that any particular fact scenario will arise during the 
course of employment.  In other words, the employee will have to 
determine the likelihood that the employer will violate an 
employment law covered under the agreement  any employment 
law  during the course of his or her employment.  Thus, to be 
completely thorough, an employee would have to (1) contemplate 
each of a myriad of different scenarios under which the employee 
would be entitled to legal relief, (2) determine the likelihood of each 
individual scenario, and (3) determine how each scenario would fare 
in terms of probability of success, expected relief, and costs in both 
litigation and arbitration. 
Thus, the cost-benefit analysis for each agreement would 
have to take all of these factors into account in comparing arbitration 
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[X(1) * (P(1)a*R(1)a  C(1)a)] + . . . + [X(n) * (P(n)a*R(n)a  C(n)a)] 
   
as compared with 
 
[X(1) * (P(1)l*R(1)l  C(1)l)] + . . . + [X(n) * (P(n)l*R(n)l  C(n)l)]48 
 
In this model, X is the probability of any particular factual scenario 
arising, and (n) represents the total number of different scenarios an 
employee could encounter during the course of employment.  The 
other variables would remain the same, but would need to be 
calculated for each scenario.  P(1)a, for example, would represent the 
probability of success at arbitration for claims relating to the first 
potential scenario.  Through this model the employee is calculating 
the probability of success, the expected relief, and the costs for each 
possible fact scenario, and then discounting this by the probability 
that the scenario will occur.  The totals for all such possible scenarios 
are then added up for arbitration and then for litigation, and the 
employee would choose whichever is higher. 
 A greatly (perhaps absurdly) simplified example of such a 
calculation would be as follows: Employee Claire is going to work for 
an employer who wants her to sign a pre-dispute agreement to 
arbitrate.  She knows that there is a 10 percent chance that she will be 
sexually harassed by her fellow employees in a manner that is 
tolerated by the employer, and a 5 percent chance that her supervisor 
will blatantly discriminate against her.  Under the co-employee 
harassment scenario, Claire has a 50 percent chance of winning 
$10,000 from a jury, with costs of $1000, while she has a 40 percent 
chance of winning $8,000 from an arbitrator, with costs of $500.  
Under the supervisor discrimination scenario, she has a 80 percent 
chance of winning $100,000 from a jury (including punitive 
damages), with costs of $4000, while she has a 80 percent chance of 
winning $50,000 from an arbitrator, with costs of $1000.  Her 
calculation would be as follows: 
                                                        
48 This comparison could also be expressed as: 
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Litigation 
(0.1 * ((0.5 * $10,000) - $1000)) + (0.05 * ((0.8 * $100,000) - $4000)) = 
$400 + $3800 = $4200 
Arbitration 
(0.1 * ((0.4 * $8000) - $500)) + (0.05 * ((0.8 * $50,000) - $1000)) = $350 + 
$1950 = $2300 
 
Thus, since the expected value of litigating the potential claims 
would be $4200, while the expected value of arbitrating the expected 
claims would be $2300, Claire would choose not to sign the 
arbitration agreement, all else being equal.  Alternatively, Claire 
would require a payment of at least $1900.01 in exchange for signing 
the arbitration agreement.49 
 If employees had perfect knowledge, they would be able to 
determine the efficiency of choosing to sign a pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement, and they would be able to bargain with the employer to 
arrive at the most efficient outcome.  But the likelihood that any 
employee would have anything approaching the necessary perfect 
information to make such a decision is surely close to zero.50  In 
comparison to the information available to employees in the post-
dispute context, pre-dispute information borders on fantasy. After a 
dispute has arisen, the facts of the dispute are largely known to 
employer and employee, and both sides can make predictions about 
the likelihood of success, potential damages, and potential costs.  But 
at the beginning of an employment relationship, the employee would 
have to know the likelihood of success, potential damages, and 
potential costs for actions which have not yet happened.  And she 
would have to know the likelihood that those actions would take 
                                                        
49 If the employer paid Claire $1900.01 to sign the arbitration agreement, her 
expected value for the agreement would be $2300 + $1900.01, or $4200.01.  
The expected value of litigation for Claire is $4200. 
50 See Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The Law of the Employment 
Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479, 525 (2001) (A 
fundamental problem with enforcing [pre-dispute waivers and arbitration 
agreements] is the inability of employees and applicants to assess the 
choices offered, because there is no contemporaneous and concrete 
employment dispute at the time the employees or applicants agree to forego 
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place.  While a new employee may have a hazy sense of the potential 
for legal claims arising out of the workplace, and may even have a 
sense of whether this particular employer has a past history of illegal 
activity, she would need clairvoyance to determine the likelihood 
that her employer would violate her employment rights.  Even if the 
employer kept meticulous track of such violations, and provided 
data to new employees on arrival, that data would offer no guarantee 
that past trends would continue into the future.  The hiring of a new 
supervisor, an unexpected merger, and even the employees personal 
choices about marriage, pregnancy, or dating could affect the 
likelihood that the employer will violate the employees rights.  
Moreover, new causes of action could arise, or courts could take a 
stricter interpretation of existing statutes. 
 There is also the potential moral hazard problem.  Moral 
hazard refers to the tendency of an insured person to relax her 
precautionary measures because she no longer has to worry about an 
unfavorable outcome.51  In the post-dispute context, an agreement to 
arbitrate will not affect the employers decision to engage in 
prohibited conduct, since the agreement applies only to an event that 
has already occurred.  However, in the pre-dispute context, a binding 
agreement not to litigate may affect whether an employer engages in 
prohibited behavior or whether it takes precautionary measures 
against such behavior.52  If the arbitration agreement changes the 
expected costs and benefits of engaging in arguable prohibited 
behavior, the employer will have different incentives with regard to 
that behavior. 
This point is most simply shown by considering a pre-dispute 
agreement to waive all claims.   If an employee were to sign an 
agreement waiving all statutory claims against the employer, then 
the employer would have no incentive to prevent such claims from 
arising.  The employer would have no incentive to make 
precautionary efforts  namely, efforts to prevent its employees and 
managers from engaging in activities which violate the employees 
rights.53  The expected costs of litigation would normally provide a 
                                                        
51 POSNER, supra note P1, at 109. 
52 See Hylton, supra note H1, at 218. 
53 Indeed, to the extent that the employer is a person  a sole proprietor, 
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significant cost to the illegal behavior, and thereby justify the 
precautionary measures.  However, the waiver agreements litigation 
elimination removes those costs. 
 As Keith Hylton has pointed out, a pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement has much in common with a waiver agreement.  An 
arbitration agreement, after all, is simply a form of waiver, in which 
the plaintiff waives the right to sue in court rather than the right to 
sue altogether.54  If the arbitration agreement provides the parties 
with a forum than is more favorable to the employer, the employers 
cost of engaging in prohibited activity will be reduced.  That 
reduction may in turn lead the employer to curtail its precautionary 
efforts.  The employers decision will be based on a comparison 
between the costs of the precaution and the bias of the arbitral forum.  
Of course, the employer will not know exactly what damage the 
prohibited activity will cause, or the exact difference in bias between 
arbitration and litigation.  But if an employer sets up a completely 
one-sided arbitration regime, the employer will be able to discount 
the costs of the prohibited activity significantly.  This may lead to a 
greater probability that the employer fails to take precautions against 
such activity.55 
                                                                                                                                  
derived utility from such behavior.  Although some individuals may derive 
utility from discrimination itself, this utility is generally ignored for 
purposes of cost-benefit analyses.  For more about notions of utility in 
discriminatory practices, see GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF 
DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971). 
54 Hylton, supra note H1, at 223. 
55 In the example provided in his paper, Prof. Hylton supposes that an 
employers agents could potentially be involved in an activity that would 
cause $100 in damage to the employee.  If the employer takes care, the 
chance of such an injury is ¼; if no care is taken, the chance of injury is ¾.  
The cost of care is $25.  Hylton then assumes that litigation would always 
correctly award the employee $100 if the injury took place.  Under such a 
regime, the employer would take care, as the cost of taking care [$25 + (1/4 
* $100) = $50] would be less than the cost of not taking care [3/4 * 100 = $75].  
However, suppose the employer and employee had signed a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement.  If the arbitral forum were biased against the 
employee, such that the employer was only held liable 25 percent of the 
time, the employer would not take care [3/4 (.25 * $100) = $18.75] rather 
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In deciding whether to sign a pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement, the employee would have to take this moral hazard 
problem into account.  The probability that a particular scenario 
raising employment law issues would occur (represented by X in our 
equation) would not be the same for arbitration and litigation.  If one 
forum is more favorable to the employer than the other, then the 
extent of the favorability will affect the employers probability of 
engaging in the activity.  Thus, we must have separate probabilities 
for arbitration.  The new analysis would look like this: 
 
[Xa(1) * (P(1)a*R(1)a  C(1)a)] + . . . + [Xa(n) * (P(n)a*R(n)a  C(n)a)] 
   
as compared with 
 
[Xl(1) * (P(1)l*R(1)l  C(1)l)] + . . . + [Xl(n) * (P(n)l*R(n)l  C(n)l)]56 
 
The only difference in this equation is that instead of X representing 
the probability of the event in both sets of equations, there is a Xa for 
arbitration and a Xl for litigation.  This is a small but significant 
change because of the calculation it represents.  Now, instead of just 
determining the probability that the employer will engage in 
prohibited activity, the employee must determine the probability as 
affected by two different adjudicatory regimes.  The difference will 
be determined by using the variances between the expected costs of 
arbitration [(P(1)a*R(1)a  C(1)a)], the expected costs of litigation 
[(P(1)l*R(1)l  C(1)l)], and the costs of any precautionary measures 
that could be taken.  This will vary for each potential situation.57 
 To add another complicating factor, many (if not most) pre-
dispute arbitration agreements are not separately negotiated; they 
are instead part of the overall employment package offered to the 
                                                                                                                                  
at 219, 224.  Hyltons example also included the costs of arbitration, which I 
have left out for simplicity. 
56 Or: ∑ ∑1 1 llllaaaa )C - R*(P * X  vs.)C - R * (P * Xn n  
57 One would expect that as the arbitral forum gets more and more unfair, 
the likelihood of prohibited activity increases.  However, at some point the 
arbitral forum becomes so unfair that the there is a likelihood of a successful 
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employee.58  Thus, the employee cannot look at the agreement 
separately and decide whether the agreement, standing alone, will 
increase the employees utility.  Instead, the employee has to weigh 
the expected value of the arbitration agreement in conjunction with 
the overall expected utility of taking the particular job.  Imagine a 
prospective employee, having gone through a job search and 
interview process, who is then presented with a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement to sign prior to employment.  The employer 
may treat it like just another of the many forms that an employee has 
to fill out.  If the employer expresses a willingness to talk about and 
negotiate over the agreement, then the employee has an incentive to 
perform an independent cost-benefit analysis.  But if the employer 
presents the agreement as a condition of employment, the employee 
has no choice about the agreement itself.  Instead, the employee must 
weigh the costs and benefits of accepting the job at hand, including 
the pre-dispute arbitration agreement, with the costs and benefits of 
going back out on the job market.  A simplified version of such a 
decision would be:  
 
J1 + [Xa(1) * (P(1)a*R(1)a  C(1)a)] + . . . + [Xa(n) * (P(n)a*R(n)a  C(n)a)] 
   
as compared with 
 
(ρ2 * ( J2 + α2)) + (ρ 3 * (J3+ α 3)) + . . . + (ρ jn * (Jjn+ α jn)) 
 
In this model, J1 is the sum of the overall costs and benefits of the job 
on the table, such as wages, benefits, hours of work required, type of 
work required, relationship with colleagues, prospects for future 
promotion, and so on.  The only factor not included in J1 would be 
the estimated value of the pre-dispute arbitration agreement.  Of 
course, J1 represents an amalgam of equations similar to the one 
constructed for the arbitration agreement.  The final expected value 
                                                        
58 Exact figures are unavailable on the percentage of employers who require 
employees to sign arbitration agreements as a condition of employment.  
However, a number of high profile cases have involved such agreements.  
See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 891-92 (9th Cir. 
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of the current job would be compared with the expected values for 
all other possible jobs. 
As for the other variables, jn represents the total number of 
potential jobs available to the employee.  The J variable represents 
the expected value for each other job that might be available 
(excluding the arbitration issue), and the ρ variable represents the 
probability that the employee could get that job.  The α variable 
represents the expected value of an arbitration agreement, if any, that 
would be required as part of that potential job.  In other words, the 
employee does not know whether other potential jobs will also 
require her to sign a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.  Thus, the 
employee would have to determine the likelihood that the other job 
will require an arbitration agreement as well as the expected value of 
such an agreement (if offered).  To break down α, one could 
construct the following equation: 
 
α = (Parb * Varb) 
 
In the equation, Parb is the probability that the employer will require 
an arbitration agreement, while Varb is the expected value of that 
agreement. 
 To be sure, in order to accept the job in the first place, the 
employee would have had to determine that the expected value of 
the offered job is higher than the expected value of all alternative 
jobs.  Or, represented as an equation: 
 
J1 > (ρ2 * J2) + (ρ 3 * J3) + . . . + (ρjn * Jjn) 
 
However, the addition of the arbitration agreement does provide a 
significant complicating factor.  First, as noted above, the expected 
value of the agreement itself is quite difficult to calculate.  Second, 
even if that can be done, the employee must determine the 
probability that other employers will also require such agreements, 
and, if they do, whether those agreements will have a similar 
expected value.  After all, other employers may have fewer or greater 
instances of statutory violations, those violations may be more or less 
serious, or the arbitration procedures may be fairer or less fair.  Since 
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to develop separate analyses for each employer in order to be 
completely accurate. 
 We have been considering the decision about a pre-dispute 
agreement from the perspective of an employee.  How would an 
employer go about deciding whether to propose an arbitration 
agreement?  The basic calculation should be the same: whether the 
expected value of taking all claims to arbitration would be greater 
than the expected value of taking the claims to litigation.  This 
calculation would have to account for the probability that such 
claims would arise.  As we noted above, the decision might be 
expressed as: 
 
[Xa(1) * (P(1)a*R(1)a  C(1)a)] + . . . + [Xa(n) * (P(n)a*R(n)a  C(n)a)]  
  
as compared with 
 
[Xl(1) * (P(1)l*R(1)l  C(1)l)] + . . . + [Xl(n) * (P(n)l*R(n)l  C(n)l)] 
 
Thus, the employer too would seem to be faced with a difficult 
decision to unpack.  However, the employer has several 
informational advantages over employees when it comes to making 
this calculation 
The employer has access to more information about the 
probability that it will engage in the prohibited behavior (X).  The 
extent of the employers knowledge depends, in part, on the extent to 
which one imparts the knowledge of the employers agents to the 
employer itself.  For example, a sole proprietor knows all about his or 
her own past history of, and proclivity for, prohibited activity.  A 
large corporation, on the other hand, may not know what lurks in the 
hearts of its middle managers.  It at least has information about their 
past activities, however, and can make some predictions about their 
future activities.  Moreover, it can take precautionary efforts to 
prevent or mitigate prohibited behavior: screening applicants for 
evidence of illegal activity; training new employees about legal rules 
and ethical conduct; and monitoring and disciplining employees for 
violations of the rules.  Knowledge of the extent of precautions taken 
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The employer is also much more likely to have thorough 
information about the arbitral forum than employees.  First, the 
employer will know the basics about the forum itself: what the 
arbitration rules are, how the arbitrators are chosen, whether class 
actions are allowed, whether punitive damages may be awarded, and 
so on.  In fact, the employer may to a large extent craft these rules 
itself.  Certainly, employers can choose an off-the-rack method of 
arbitration, such as the rules and procedures of the American 
Arbitration Association.59  But they are choosing the process, and 
thereby will acquire significant information about it.  Employees may 
or may not have access to the procedures when they sign the 
arbitration agreement, but they may find it difficult and expensive to 
obtain a real understanding of those procedures.  Certainly, an 
employer may incur costs in choosing and setting up a method of 
arbitration, and these costs should be included in the process.  But in 
exchange for these costs, the employer will have a much better sense 
of the effect of the forum on the probabilities of success, the value of 
the relief, and the costs of the forum.60  Moreover, the employer will 
gain further information about the process over time, as it 
experiences actual arbitrations through the agreement.  Employees 
will likely only have exposure to arbitration once.61 
Finally, if the employer knows that its costs will be lower in 
arbitration and that its likelihood of success in arbitration will be no 
less than in litigation, then the employer knows that an arbitration 
agreement will always make economic sense.  Certainly, employees 
would know the same: they should sign if their costs are lower and 
their chance of success is no less.  But employers should be able to 
establish these conditions with much more certainty than employees 
                                                        
59 See National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes, American 




60 As discussed below in Part II.A.4, the employer also can spread the costs 
of obtaining this knowledge across all of its employee arbitration 
agreements, while the employee must absorb the costs individually. 
61 The advantages of the employers experiences with arbitration over time 
are often referred to as the repeat player effect. See Bingham, supra note 
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could.  As noted above, employers can choose the rules and 
procedures of the arbitral forum.  Thus, employers will know 
whether those procedures are no more generous to or biased toward 
the employee than litigation procedures.  In fact, the employer can 
make sure that arbitration procedures do not favor the employee.  
Employees could theoretically propose alternative rules and 
procedures to make sure the arbitration procedures do not favor the 
employer, but the employee is not likely to know enough to propose 
a set of alternative rules.  In order to develop alternate procedures, an 
employee would likely need the costly services of an attorney.  
Moreover, an employer is likely to insist on its rules, leaving the 
employee to make the calculation as to whether this job offers more 
utility than the other potential jobs.  The end result is that the 
employers proposed procedures will likely be the final ones, 
enabling the employer to insure that the arbitral process at least does 
not favor the employee. 
 
C.  Behavioral Concerns about the Pre-Dispute Agreement Analysis 
 Given the complexity of these analyses, as well as their lack of 
information about the underlying factors, it is virtually impossible 
for employees to make an accurate valuation of the pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement.  In the face of this impossibility, employees 
might react in different ways.  They might assign a high negative 
value to the arbitration agreement and refuse to sign any such 
agreement.  They might assign a minimal negative value, or a 
positive value, to such an agreement and sign it without further 
thought.  Or they might recognize that the agreement has some value 
to the employer and negotiate for some payout in exchange for 
executing the agreement.   
I know of no data, other than anecdotal, that suggests what 
employees are actually doing.  However, there is psychological 
research that suggests employees are likely to assign minimal 
positive or negative values to such agreements.  The complexity of 
the decision would probably drive employees to abandon any effort 
to do a cost-benefit analysis.62  While employees may begin to work 
                                                        
62 Russel B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
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through the costs and benefits of signing the agreement, the 
difficulties in aggregating the factors, as well as the lack of 
information about each factor, would lead an employee to stop short 
of a real analysis.  In the face of this frustration, employees would be 
likely to resolve their dilemma through the use of decision-making 
short-cuts, described in the cognitive psychology literature as 
heuristics.  These heuristics, which have been studied and 
developed since the 1970s, have recently received a fair amount of 
attention in legal academia.  The heuristics form the basis for a new 
approach to legal decisionmaking theory, known as behavioral 
decision theory 63or behavioral law and economics.64  This 
approach counsels that the rational actor thesis, found at the core of 
law and economics, must be tempered based on known 
irrationalities in human behavior.  These irrationalities, according 
to some theorists, stem from an adaptive approach to complex or 
difficult decisions.  In order to resolve certain types of 
decisonmaking quandaries, people will often adopt short cuts, or 
heuristics, that lead to non-rational decisions in certain types of 
situations.65 
The flashpoint we have been examining  the employees 
decision to sign a predipute agreement  may be subject to influence 
by several of the heuristics identified by researchers.  Given the 
complexities of the pre-dispute agreement analysis, it is not 
surprising that employees would resort to some form of 
decisionmaking short-cut in deciding whether to sign.  A description 
of heuristics which may have an effect on the process are described 
below. 
1. Immediacy bias.  Imagine yourself as an employee on your 
first day of work at a new job.  A human resources administrator 
                                                                                                                                  
decision as a leading cause of departures from the type of complete cost-
benefit analysis of decision options predicted by expected utility theory.). 
63 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The New Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, 
Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 739 (2000). 
64 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1534 (1998).  
65 Given the savings in time and resources, these heuristics may be 
rational in the sense that they ultimately are more efficient to the 
decisionmaker than traditional cost-benefit analysis.  See POSNER, supra note 
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presents you with, among other forms, a pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement.  The administrator tells you that this agreement is 
company policy, and you must sign it in order to be formally 
employed.  If you begin to think about it, the pros of signing the 
agreement are all immediate: you can stay at the job, receive a 
paycheck, and continue with your plans for success.  The cons are all 
uncertain and in the future: if, perchance, you are fired, harassed, or 
otherwise injured in violation of the law, you will have to take your 
claim to arbitration rather than court.  Which factors will be weighted 
more heavily in your quick cost-benefit analysis?66 
Researchers have found evidence that individuals have a 
preference for activities that delivers immediate benefits over those 
that delay any potential benefits.67  For example, researchers found 
that most subjects preferred a check of $100 available immediately to 
a check of $200 that could not be cashed for two years.68  In the case 
of employment arbitration, the pull of the immediately available 
benefit is even stronger, as the alternatives are generally not certain 
prospects.  Thus, an employee may have an economically irrational 
bias towards the current job and its pre-dispute agreement, based on 
the strong psychic pull of the here and now and certain. 
2. Optimism bias.   The term optimism bias refers not to an 
overall sunny disposition, but rather to the general tendency of 
individuals to underestimate the likelihood that something bad will 
happen to them.  For example, even though applicants for a marriage 
license correctly estimated that the national divorce rate was fifty 
percent, their modal estimation of their own chance of divorce was 
                                                        
66 This hypothetical has resonance with commentators.  See, e.g., Victoria J. 
Craine, Note, The Mandatory Arbitration Clause: Forum Selection or Employee 
Coercion?, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 537, 537 (1999); Grodin, supra note G1, at 3-6..   
67 See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic 
Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1203-05 (1998) 
(discussing evidence of immediacy bias). 
68 See George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discounting, in CHOICE OVER 
TIME 57, 69 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992), cited in Jon D. 
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously: The Problem of 
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 655 (1999).  Interestingly, the 
study found that people did not prefer a $100 check payable in six years to a 
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zero.69  College students in another study were six times more likely 
to respond that they expected their job satisfaction to be above the 
average of their peers than below the average.70  Similarly, 
respondents perceived themselves to be less likely than the average 
to be unemployed.71  It is apparently human nature to expect oneself 
to be less likely than others to suffer from misfortune, or more likely 
to experience success.  This optimism may extend to the employment 
relationship: the employee may place an unrealistically low 
probability on the likelihood that some sort of employment law 
dispute will arise.72 
The optimism bias may be one component of a more complex 
set of responses to uncertainty.  For example, one theory is that the 
optimism bias may be a variant on the availability heuristic, which 
concerns the effect of ones pool of knowledge on probabilistic 
calculations.  In assessing the likelihood of certain events, people are 
unduly influenced by their own pool of personal information.  They 
overestimate the relevance of certain events or instances that are 
available to their memories in ways that other events may not be.  
For example, most people incorrectly believe that homicides and car 
accidents kill more Americans than diabetes and stomach cancer.73  
Psychology researchers theorize that the basis of this misperception 
is the availability to peoples memories, primarily through the 
media, of instances of car accidents or murders.  Instances of diabetes 
or stomach cancer deaths receive less attention, although they are 
sadly far more common.  In the case of events like divorce and 
unemployment, individuals who have not experienced these events 
                                                        
69 See Lynn Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above 
Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993), cited in Hanson & Kysar, supra note HK1, at 
655. 
70 See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 810 (1980) , cited in Hanson & Kysar, 
supra note HK1, at 655. 
71 See id. 
72 See Christine M. Reilly, Comment, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary 
Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting 
Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1228-30 (2002). 
73 See SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 
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may not have vivid stories available to their memories, and would 
underestimate the likelihood of such events.  If workers have not 
experienced an employment dispute, either directly or through the 
experience of someone they know, they may underestimate the 
likelihood that such an experience would arise.74  Conversely, if they 
have such an experience in their information pool, they may 
overestimate the likelihood of such an event recurring.75 
However, the effects of the optimism or overconfidence bias 
seem to extend beyond the scope of ones experience.  Instead, this 
optimism seems to play a strong role in shaping the perceptions of 
that experience.  For example, one study provided a group of law 
students with factual information relating to a hypothetical lawsuit.76  
Those students assigned to be counsel for the plaintiffs interpreted 
the facts as favorable to the plaintiff, while students assigned as 
defense counsel interpreted the facts as favorable to the defendant.77  
Thus, even if employees were given information about the potential 
for employment-related disputes, they might optimistically believe 
that they would be able to avoid such disputes.  This tendency is 
what researchers refer to as the confirmatory or self-serving 
bias.78  As with marriage and unemployment, people do not appear 
to enter a job with the expectation that their employment law rights 
will be violated.  It does not seem unreasonable to predict that 
                                                        
74 See Reilly, supra note R1, at 1232-33. 
75 One might argue that the increasing publicity about employment disputes 
would make such dispute available to employees.  However, as Sarah 
Randolph Cole noted in 1996, [p]ublicity about the use of arbitration to 
resolve employment disputes and the consequent effects arbitration has on 
the resolution of discrimination claims is quite limited.  Cole, supra note 
RC1, at 481.  Although arbitration has received more attention since 1996, it 
is hard to measure whether knowledge about such agreements has 
permeated the national consciousness. 
76 See George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and 
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993), cited in Korobkin & Ulen, 
supra note KU1, at 1088; Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgements of Fairness in 
Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337 (1995), cited in Korobkin & Ulen, supra 
note KU1, at 1088. 
77 See Loewenstein et al, supra note L1, at 151-52; Babcock, supra note B1, at 
1340. 
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individuals will assign a smaller probability to the chance of an 
employment dispute than reality would require.79 
3. Framing effects.   Numerous studies have shown that the 
way choices are framed has an effect on how individuals make those 
choices.  This notion may seem like common sense.  But framing 
effects can work in strange and irrational ways.  For example, studies 
of employee investment behavior show that employees will alter 
their investment strategies based on the choices in front of them.  
One such study offered employees the choice between a stock fund 
and a bond fund with different rates of return.  One group of 
employees was shown the one-year rates of return, while another 
group was shown a simulated distribution of the thirty-year rates of 
returns for the funds.  Employees shown the one-year rate invested a 
majority of their money in the bond fund, while those shown the 
thirty-year rates chose to invest almost everything in the stock fund.80 
All of this is to suggest that our decisionmaking processes are 
susceptible to influence.  We may place undue importance on the 
facts as presented to us or as highlighted in a set of materials.  In 
providing the arbitration agreement for the employee to execute, the 
employer has the choice about how to frame the decision.  The 
employer could tell the employee that the arbitration program offers 
a chance for employees to save money on legal bills.  Or the 
employer could present the agreement as just a mere formality, part 
of the set of forms that all employees sign on their first day.  An 
agreement to arbitrate might be part of an employee handbook, or 
may not even be given to the employee.  Certainly, more research is 
necessary to determine what kinds of framing employers may 
engage in, and whether these framing devices have any effects.  But it 
certainly would not be surprising to find that employees have 
different types of reactions to different methods of presenting the 
arbitration agreement.  Such framing effects add another level of 
irrationality to the cost-benefit analysis. 
 
D.  The Advantages of Deferring Arbitration Decisions 
                                                        
79 See Cole, supra note RC1, at 480-81; Reilly, supra note R1, at 1228-30. 
80 See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Risk Aversion or Myopia? 
Choices in Repeated Gambles and Retirement Investments (Nov. 8, 1997) 
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 Before discussing the conclusions we can draw from the 
models discussed above, a brief summary may be in order.  After a 
dispute has arisen, the employee and employer will agree to submit 
that dispute to arbitration if the expected value of arbitration is 
greater than the expected value of litigation.  Expressed as an 
equation, the parties would choose arbitration if: 
 
Pa*Ra  Ca > Pl*Rl  Cl 
 
If the parties differ as to their preferred forum, one party will pay the 
other party to insure that they both agree to the most efficient forum.  
Certainly, there is no guarantee that the parties will have the perfect 
information necessary to insure an efficient result.  But the types of 
information required  the probability of success, the potential for 
relief, and the estimated costs  are data that parties and professional 
players attempt to estimate all the time. 
 Before the dispute has arisen, the parties must make a 
different determination. The pre-dispute decision is far more 
complex, particularly for the employee.  The employee must 
calculate what the potential costs and benefits would be for all 
potential situations involving prohibited activities.  Then he must 
estimate the probabilities that these situations would arise.  As noted 
above, the expression of this decision would be: 
 
[Xa(1) * (P(1)a*R(1)a  C(1)a)] + . . . + [Xa(n) * (P(n)a*R(n)a  C(n)a)]   
 
as compared with 
 
[Xl(1) * (P(1)l*R(1)l  C(1)l)] + . . . + [Xl(n) * (P(n)l*R(n)l  C(n)l)] 
 
If the agreement is required by the employer, the employee would 
have to factor in this agreement in comparing the current job with all 
other potential jobs.  Again, such a decision could be expressed as: 
 
J1 + [Xa(1) * (P(1)a*R(1)a  C(1)a)] + . . . + [Xa(n) * (P(n)a*R(n)a  C(n)a)]  
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(ρ2 * ( J2 + α2)) + (ρ 3 * (J3+ α 3)) + . . . + (ρ jn * (Jjn+ α jn)) 
 
The information needed for these calculations is far more difficult to 
obtain than the simple (P*R)  C.  And in all likelihood, the employee 
will find it economically inefficient to consult an attorney or other 
expert, since (1) the costs of obtaining the information will likely be 
greater than the benefits, and (2) the agreement may well be a 
condition of employment.  Given the impossible task of making an 
economically rational decision about such an agreement, employees 
are prone to use decisionmaking shortcuts to make up their mind  
shortcuts that may lead to systematically irrational results. 
 What does this analysis tell us about these agreements?  In 
my view, it tells us that post-dispute agreements to arbitrate are 
much more likely to be based on good information, and therefore 
much more likely to be not only efficient but optimal for both sides.  
Pre-dispute agreements, on the other hand, are more likely to be 
based on primitive guesswork, or less, on the part of the employee.  
The worse the information, the greater the chance that the 
agreements will not be efficient.  In addition, the employer is likely to 
have a significant informational advantage over the employee.  
Employers may use this advantage to construct inefficient 
agreements that employees would not agree to if they had perfect 
information.81 
                                                        
81 Keith Hylton has greater faith in the ability of employees to get the 
information they need to decide efficiently about pre-dispute agreements.  
Hylton believes that employees are making a rational bet that they will be 
better off as a result of the agreement, and that the parties should be left to 
abide by the results of their bet.  See Hylton, supra note H1, at 251.  My 
response to this argument is discussed further in the text infra.  Hylton also 
argues that employees may be exhibiting rational apathy in not attending 
to the details of the agreement, on the grounds that the expected costs of 
investigation may be too high for the potential benefits gained.  See id. at 
252.  However, the costs for an individual employee might be high enough 
that the employee takes a real utility hit, rather than a de minimis loss.  In 
such cases, the employer can take advantage of the economy of scale to 
extract rents from employees unwilling to challenge the employers 
position.  See Cole, supra note RC1, at 475-76.  Hylton also argues that 
competition amongst employers for employees will drive unfair arbitration 
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 Of course, there is no general legal requirement that contracts 
be efficient.  Nor must parties have good information about the 
substance of an agreement in order for that agreement to be 
enforceable.  People make contracts all the time involving risk  risk 
which may be very difficult to calculate.  When a member of the 
public purchases a share of a companys stock, for example, that 
person may have no idea what the real value of that stock should be.  
Other players in the market may have access to sophisticated 
analyses about the companys management, the industrys prospects, 
and the economys direction.  But this person might have purchased 
the stock because they liked the companys logo.  Similarly, people 
can buy insurance for event about which they know little, in terms of 
probability.  Homeowners insurance is just one example  how 
likely are such events as theft, fire, flood or hurricane?  How much 
should insurance against these events cost?  People make ill-
informed decisions about risk all the time.  Why should we care in 
this case?82 
 First, I think we generally do care about situations where one 
party is consistently likely to have an informational advantage over 
another party.  While a person need not conduct a thorough analysis 
of a companys prospects before buying its stock, federal securities 
regulation insures that a vast supply of information is available for 
those who wish to make use of it.  Moreover, those with special 
                                                                                                                                  
However, if employees do not accurately price those agreements, they will 
not realize (until too late) the advantages of such agreements. Thus, an 
employer who offered a fair agreement would be punished by the market, 
as employees would undervalue such agreements.  Finally, Hylton argues 
that even if employees can be taken advantage of in the short term, they will 
eventually realize this and demand less biased agreements (or not 
agreements) in the future.  See id. at 253-54.  I would agree that, over time, 
employees will become more aware of the pros and cons of such 
agreements.  Their psychological availability will increase, particularly if 
the media highlights egregious examples of such agreements.  Employees 
may even band together to get more information about such agreements.  
But the time of such awareness has clearly not arrived yet. 
82 See id. at 251 (It is common in contract settings for one party to know 
more than the other about some aspect of the deal, and so for the 
uninformed party to make a statistical bet that he is better off entering the 
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insider information are prohibited from trading.  Insurance 
companies are heavily regulated by state commissions, in part due to 
the informational disadvantage of consumers.  Even state lotteries 
tell buyers that they only have a 1 in 120 million chance of winning 
the Powerball jackpot.83  When there are possible information 
discrepancies, the law often steps in to ameliorate such discrepancies 
or their effects. 
 Second, one of the primary ideological bases for contract law 
is the notion of Pareto optimality.  Two parties will only agree to a 
contract if they both expect to be better off from it.  Certainly, after 
the contract has been fully performed, one side may find itself worse 
off than it expected to be.  But economically rational parties will not 
execute a contract unless they expect it to increase their utility.  This 
expectation  that everyone will be better off if this exchange occurs  
forms the cornerstone of economic thinking, and also provides the 
normative foundation for economic theory.  While the wealth-
maximization norm in economics has its fair share of critics, the norm 
of Pareto optimality is much less controversial.84  Its relative scarcity 
in the real-world of policymaking makes it even more attractive 
when it does surface.85  Thus, if it turns out that parties are not 
making rational calculations that a certain agreement will make them 
better off, the normative justifications for contract law are 
weakened.86 
Third, employment laws provide state-mandated rights to 
employees.  These laws represent a public decision to compensate 
individuals for certain types of injuries.  If employees are signing 
away important procedural protections for those rights, society has 
more of an interest than if employees are merely agreeing to lower 
wages.  The Supreme Court has found pre-dispute waivers of 
employment law rights to be unenforceable, because such rights are 
                                                        
83 See, e.g., http://www.molottery.state.mo.us/aboutourgames/howtowin 
/numbergames/powerball/powerball_understandingodds.shtm 
84 See POSNER, supra note P1, at 12 (Who can quarrel with unanimity as a 
criterion of social choice?). 
85 See id. at 13. 
86 Of course, some theories of contract law place no reliance on the notion of 
Pareto optimality.  See Barnett, supra note B1, at 271-91 (discussing different 
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deemed to represent a societal entitlement.87  The remedial benefits 
offered by these statutes, along with the deterrence effects of such 
remedies, are deemed to be part of a congressional command that 
each employee be free from discriminatory practices.88  The 
Supreme Court has premised its approval of pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements on the notion that they are not waivers of the underlying 
substantive rights.89  However, a biased pre-dispute agreement to 
arbitrate effectively acts as a waiver.90  Even a slightly biased 
agreement weakens the effects of the statutory entitlements.  Thus, to 
the extent employees are taking a risk by using incomplete 
information, they are gambling with their congressional entitlements. 
Finally, one has to ask, what is the point of the pre-dispute 
agreement?  What is the risk that the agreement is allocating?  
After all, an employee can agree to arbitrate a dispute after it arises.  
Why constrain that choice beforehand?91  When other contracts are 
made based on poor information, the contract is often intended to 
                                                        
87 In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Inc., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974) the Court 
wrote: 
Title VII . . . concerns . . . an individual's right to equal 
employment opportunities. Title VII's strictures are absolute 
and represent a congressional command that each 
employee be free from discriminatory practices. Of 
necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the 
collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights 
would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind 
Title VII. In these circumstances, an employee's rights under 
Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver. 
88 Id. at 51. 
89 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001); Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane, Inc., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1991). 
90 See Hylton, supra note H1, at 230 (If the arbitral forum is heavily biased 
in favor of the defendant, then an arbitration agreement may be effectively 
equivalent to a waiver.). 
91 As one advocate puts it, If proponents of arbitration are correct in their 
belief that it is faster, cheaper and better than the judicial system, then 
surely employees and their attorneys will opt for arbitration in a voluntary 
system.  See National Organization of Women Testimony, available at: 
http://www.now.org/issues/wfw/nasd-testimony.html (address of 
Patricia Ireland, president of NOW, to a committee of the National 
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hedge the risk inherent in the situation.  People buy stocks, for 
example, to provide capital to a risky enterprise.  The company 
receives funds it could not otherwise acquire (due to the risk), and 
the stock buyer receives the opportunity to participate in the 
companys profits.  The buyer knows that she has imperfect 
information, but that risk is part of the reason for the deal.  Similarly, 
insurance contracts are a straightforward hedge against risk; a 
homeowner buys flood insurance to mitigate the financial harms of a 
potential flood.  But why would parties sign a pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement?  Are the parties hedging a risk?  If so, a risk of what?  At 
initial glance, the pre-dispute agreement is only a hedge against 
litigation; it prevents the possibility that the parties will not agree to 
arbitrate the dispute later.  But both parties will clearly have better 
information about the costs and benefits of arbitration after the 




II. POTENTIAL THEORIES FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF PRE-DISPUTE 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
 
 The following section is an effort to answer these questions, 
namely by explaining why pre-dispute arbitration agreements may 
provide greater efficiency under certain conditions than post-dispute 
agreements.  It is not enough that the pre-dispute agreements lead to 
generally efficient results if those same results could have been 
achieved through a post-dispute agreement.  As an example, let us 
suppose a world where arbitration costs are always less than 
litigation and arbitration results are always as equally fair as 
litigation results.  In such a world, it would be efficient for both 
parties to sign a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.  But rational 
parties would also always agree to arbitrate their dispute after the 
dispute arose; there would be no benefit to parties for signing a pre-
dispute agreement.92 
                                                        
92 See, e.g., Shavell, supra note SS1, at 5 ([W]hile reduction in costs is an 
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Therefore, in order for pre-dispute agreements to serve some 
efficiency purpose, they must force some parties into arbitration 
when they would not have chosen to do so post-dispute.  Moreover, 
the agreement must force such parties into a more efficient outcome 
than they would have reached without the agreement.  The following 
are efforts to describe such conditions, grouped in the categories of 
(A) ex ante benefits, (B) prevention of irrational arbitration rejection, 
and (C) the reduction of societal externalities. 
 
A. Ex Ante Benefits 
 It is perhaps difficult to imagine a scenario that fits our two 
criteria for pre-dispute agreement efficiency: (1) it would be more 
efficient for the parties to choose arbitration over litigation to resolve 
a particular dispute, but (2) at least one of the parties would not 
choose arbitration without the presence of an arbitration agreement.  
The Coase theorem teaches that if arbitration is the more efficient 
outcome, the parties will bargain and will end up choosing 
arbitration.  Even though one party might have a preference for 
litigation at the outset of negotiations, the parties would ultimately 
decide to choose arbitration if arbitration is more efficient.  Thus, the 
Coase theorem would seem to rebut claims that post-dispute 
agreements will never take place because one side or the other will 
always prefer litigation after the dispute has arise.93  Even if litigation 
always offers an advantage for one side, the parties will negotiate 
around the litigation default option if it is more efficient to proceed 
to arbitration. 
However, the following five possibilities describe how pre-
dispute agreements might offer ex ante benefits by constraining the 
parties from choosing litigation after the dispute has arisen.  In other 
words, the pre-dispute agreement provides greater efficiency by 
forcing the parties into an arbitration that is socially efficient but 
                                                        
93 See, e.g., David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary 
Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment 
Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 37 (2003) 
(In order for a post-dispute arbitration voluntary arbitration system to 
work, both the plaintiffs and the defense lawyer need to conclude that 
arbitrations benefits outweigh its costs and that arbitration represents the 
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would not have been chosen after the dispute arose.  In each case, 
although one of the parties would have a post-dispute preference for 
litigation that could be overcome through negotiation, the overall 
good is better served by preventing that party from litigating. 
 1. Spreading the benefits.  If arbitration provides more efficiency 
as between the parties than litigation, the parties will bargain to go to 
arbitration.  In a post-dispute scenario, the employer and employee 
would negotiate to split the benefits that accrue from choosing 
arbitration over litigation.  Both the employee and employer might 
have equally lower litigation costs, and thus would not exchange any 
payment as part of the deal.  However, in other cases the employer 
might have significantly lower costs than the employee would.  In 
negotiating over the potential forum, each party could bargain to 
obtain some of the surplus.  For example, assume that an employee is 
threatening to bring a suit against an employer.  The employees 
costs would be the same in both arbitration and litigation, but the 
suit would cost an employer an estimated $10,000 to litigate but only 
$1,000 to arbitrate.  The employee would negotiate with the employer 
to arbitrate the dispute in exchange for receiving some of the $9,000 
in savings. 
 If we assume a world in which arbitration always saves an 
employer significant costs as compared to litigation fees, then a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement would save an employer significant 
sums.  What happens to that money?  The employer gets it, but 
theoretically employees could bargain for that surplus as well.  
However, in the pre-dispute world, the money cannot be allocated 
only to those employees who will eventually bring a claim against 
the employer.  Instead, employees have to bargain individually for 
what they believe is their share of the employers surplus.  If each 
employee is a potential claimant, then each employee will deserve a 
share of the surplus.  As an example, C&C Co. has 10 employees.  
Based on the past history of C&C, as well as societal trends, the 
employees and the employer would predict that  two of these ten 
employees will bring claims against the employer during the course 
of their career.  These claims would each cost the employer $10,000 to 
litigate but $1,000 to arbitrate.  If all employees choose to sign a pre-
dispute agreement, the employer will save $18,000.  Each of the ten 
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surplus.  However, their pro rata share of the surplus would only be 
$1,800.  Thus, if the employer distributed all of its surplus equally to 
the employees, each employee would receive $1,800 for signing the 
pre-dispute agreement.  However, if employees did not sign such 
agreements, two of the employees would be able to negotiate a $9,000 
payment when they brought their claims, while the other employees 
would receive nothing. 
 In this example, the pre-dispute agreement serves as a form of 
reverse litigation insurance.  If you think of litigation as a windfall, 
and if employees are risk averse, a risk-averse employee might 
choose a 100 percent chance of receiving $1,800 to a 20 percent 
chance of receiving $9,000.  Thus, a pre-dispute agreement might 
provide better overall utility.  Certainly, an employee would have no 
incentive to voluntarily share his or her settlement with the other 
employees after a dispute has arisen.  By locking in employees ahead 
of time, the pre-dispute agreement insures that the efficiency gains 
are spread to all employees, not just those who choose to litigate. 
However, there are several problems with this model.  First, it 
assumes that the employer passes on all of the cost savings to the 
employees.  Employees, however, are in a much better position to 
extract this surplus after the dispute has already arisen.  As discussed 
in Part I, it is a lot harder to calculate the cost savings for a pre-
dispute agreement than it is for a post-dispute agreement.  The 
employer and employee will know a lot more about the nature of the 
claim, and therefore the potential costs, when the claim is on the 
table.  Moreover, individual employees lack the information to know 
exactly what costs savings a pre-dispute agreement will create.  As 
noted above, the informational difficulties may lead employees to 
ignore or guess about the factors that would go into a proper cost-
benefit analysis of the agreement. 
A second problem is that this reverse insurance would act 
to draw money away from those who are injured and give it to the 
rest of the employee class.  If an employment claim really were like 
the lottery, this development might not raise concerns.  However, an 
employment claim stems from an injury inflicted in violation of a 
legal mandate.  Taking money away from the injured to spread 
amongst the non-injured seems a perverse method of societal 
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employment discrimination claims, are more likely to be members of 
a protected class: racial or ethnic minorities, women, the elderly, or 
the disabled.  Certainly the policies underlying the civil rights acts 
would be undermined by agreements which took money from 
injured victims of these groups and distributed it to all employees.  
Finally, weve been assuming that all of the arbitration surplus for 
the employer comes from a savings in the costs of litigation.  If some 
of the surplus comes from a savings in the amount of relief rendered, 
then the victims are actually paying for the surplus out of their 
entitlement.94  As another example, let us assume DDD Inc. will save 
an expected $10,000 if a case is taken to arbitration, not in costs saved 
but in a reduction in the expected award.  (The expected award from 
litigation is $30,000, while the expected award from arbitration is 
$20,000.)  This may be due to the bias of the arbitrator, an arbitral 
limit on certain types of damages, or other factors.  Regardless, if an 
employee knows about this difference, he or she may negotiate with 
DDD to receive it in exchange for taking the case to arbitration.  After 
all, the employee is entitled to the expected $30,000 benefit under 
law.  However, under a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, the 
employee would not be able to bargain for this surplus after the fact; 
instead, it would accrue entirely to DDD.  Employees might be able 
to negotiate for the expected bias differential ahead of time.  
However, the differential would accrue to all employees, rather than 
those who are injured.  The injured employees would get only a 
fraction of the $10,000 bias differential.  This result would obviously 
undermine the remedial purposes of the employment law 
protections. 
Given these objections, the spreading-the-benefits theory 
fails to provide sufficient efficiency justifications for pre-dispute 
agreements. 
 2. Trading a few big claims for many small ones.  A more 
promising justification finds its most prominent proponent in Samuel 
                                                        
94 See Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to 
the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735, 750 
(2001) (noting that if the only source of savings from arbitration is lower 
awards, then the Gilmer rule undoes, to some extent, the effects of the 
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Estreicher and his Saturns for Rickshaws theory.95  According to 
Estreicher, litigation is not a usable entitlement for many employees.  
For those employees with low wages, less severe employment law 
injuries, or less certain litigation outcomes, the costs of litigation may 
be too high to bring suit.  Most employees cannot pay attorneys 
enough to take the suit for a preset fee, and the potential contingency 
fees are too small for these claims.  Other employees, however, have 
higher salaries, and suffer injuries that may entitle them to 
compensatory or punitive damages.  These employees also benefit 
from an unpredictable jury system, which could provide a range of 
damages extending up to sizeable sums.  These employees can 
readily find attorneys, and can often secure large settlements with 
the threat of litigation.  Thus, Estreicher paints a picture of two sets of 
employees: those with rickshaws  namely, claims too small to be 
litigated  and those with Cadillacs  namely, suits which entitle 
them to significant awards.96 
 Put in cost-benefit terms, Estreicher is raising the possibility 
that in some cases, an employer might game the system to prevent a 
claim from going to arbitration even where it might be efficient to do 
so.  As an example, let us suppose that an employer violates an 
employees employment law rights, and as a result the employee 
suffers an injury of $1000.  The costs of litigating the dispute are 
$1000, and the employee would have an 80 percent chance of success.  
The costs of arbitrating the dispute would be $200, and the employee 
would have a 75 percent chance of success.  Doing a cost benefit 
analysis, the litigation computation reaches a negative result for the 
employee: (.80 * $1000) - $1000 = -$200.  The arbitration result is 
much better: (.75 * $1000) - $200 = $550.  If we assume that the 
employer has exactly the same costs, the employer would also prefer 
arbitration to litigation.  The expected value of litigation would be 
(.80 * -$1000) - $1000 = -$1800, while the expected value of arbitration 
would be (.75 * -$1000) - $200 = -$950. However, if (assuming perfect 
                                                        
95 Estreicher, supra note E1, at 558.  
96 See id. at 563.  See also Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate 
Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1357 (1996) (In short, 
we have a system in which a few individuals in protected classes win a 
lottery of sorts, while others queue up in the administrative agencies and 
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information) the employer knows that the employee would lose 
money by bringing the suit, the employer will not agree to 
arbitration.  Even though it is more efficient for both parties to 
pursue arbitration, the employee will be unable to sufficiently 
compensate the employer for choosing arbitration, and the employer 
will sit tight and wait for the employee to go away.  This result  $0  
is obviously the best result for the employer, and it will be preferable 
to the employee as compared to litigations $200 loss. 
 Assuming this situation, it would have been preferable to the 
employee to have signed a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.  In 
such a case, the employer would be locked into arbitration, and 
therefore could not reject the option later on.  Of course, if litigation 
costs were a barrier to every employment claim, the employer would 
be able to sit tight on every claim, and therefore would not agree to a 
pre-dispute agreement.  Thus, the tradeoff that would make the pre-
dispute agreement palatable to the employer is lower exposure on 
the claims that could go to litigation.  Thus, the employer will have to 
save costs on litigable claims  potentially through lower awards  in 
order to balance out the increase in costs for nonlitigable claims.  To 
use Estreichers metaphor, if some workers are to get the chance to 
trade their rickshaws for Saturns,97 others will have to trade in their 
Cadillacs. 
 Estreichers argument is really a form of reverse insurance 
discussed above, in that it takes from the few (with big claims) and 
gives to the many (with small claims).98  It even has a Robin Hood 
quality to it, since the few in his discussion are generally well-paid 
employees and the many are lower-paid employees.  As a whole, 
employees may wish to exchange the possibility of a high litigation 
award for a better shot at compensation for their smaller grievances.  
                                                        
97 The term Saturn refers to cars produced by the Saturn Corporation, a 
division of General Motors that specializes in mid-priced, consumer-
friendly cars.  I must admit that as a former and satisfied owner of a Saturn, 
this metaphor is particularly effective to me.  However, Saturns have 
recently received some poor marks from the trade press.  See Jerry Flint, The 
Rings Fall Off Saturn, Forbes.com (Jan. 1, 2003), available at: 
http://www.forbes.com/home_europe/2003/01/01/cz_jf_0101flint.html. 
98 I call it reverse insurance since insurance takes from the many and gives 
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However, I have several concerns with Estreichers theory.  First, he 
assumes that employees with small claims will not engage in any 
strategic decisionmaking in order to get compensation.  Turning back 
to our example, the employer rejects post-dispute arbitration because 
it knows litigation has a negative net return for the employee (-$200).  
Thus, the employer assumes the employee wont pursue her claim.  
However, the employee would know that litigation also has a 
negative net return for the employer  a much more significant one (-
$1800).  Might an employee then decide to play a game of litigation 
chicken?  In other words, the employee would go forward with the 
claim, even though it is a losing proposition, because she would 
expect the employer to blink first and offer a settlement or agree to 
arbitration.  It might be a risky strategy, since it might end up with a 
$200 loss, but the employee would know it was in the employers 
best interest to settle.  Even if the employer paid only $201, the 
employee would be better off (by $1) and the employer would be 
$1599 better off.  Estreicher might argue that employees with small 
claims could not even get their claims filed, since plaintiffs attorneys 
would not be willing to sign on to this strategy.  However, 
employees can file charges with the EEOC for free.99  As other 
commentators have pointed out, employers may be willing to settle 
even baseless claims in order to avoid the costs of an EEOC 
investigation and potential lawsuit.100 
  Second, in order for Estreichers model to make economic 
sense for employees, there has to be some set of cases that would net 
the employee a positive return in arbitration but a negative return in 
litigation.  If even meritless suits have value in the current system, 
however, how many claims fit this category?  In other words, for 
how many claims is there a smaller net benefit to pursuing a strategy 
of settlement and litigation rather than just dropping the suit 
entirely?  This question is largely an empirical one, and it depends on 
(1) the cost differences between arbitration and litigation in 
                                                        
99 See Filing a Charge of Employment Discrimination, available at: 
http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview_charge_filing.html. 
100 David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory 
Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, 
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employment cases, and (2) the distribution of values for the various 
employment law claims.  Estreichers hypothesis  that a number of 
low-value claims are being stymied  may be correct, but there is 
insufficient data to know what this number might be.  If the number 
is small, then employees might end up trading in more Cadillacs 
than rickshaws. 
 Third, Estreichers clever metaphor for his system masks part 
of the underlying dynamic.  By labeling high-value claims as 
Cadillacs, and low-value claims as rickshaws, Estreicher makes 
his new system of Saturns seem more egalitarian.  But why do 
some claimants have high-value claims, and others low-value claims?  
One reason may be their incomes: those with higher salaries will 
have greater damages for lost wages and future compensation.  But 
another reason may be the severity of their claim.  An employee who 
is fired, for example, will generally have a more significant injury, 
and therefore a greater damages claim, than an employee in the same 
position who was not promoted.  An employee who suffered 
continual and degrading sexual harassment may be entitled to 
substantial compensatory and punitive damages.  These employees 
have higher claims for a reason: their injuries are worse.  Thus, an 
employee is not necessarily driving a Cadillac because she has a 
cushy job; she may have just sustained grievous damages.101  So this 
system begins to look like the previous one  taking a chunk from 
those with significant claims and spreading it around to those with 
small or no claims. 
 Finally, Estreichers description of arbitration results would 
seem to assume that all workers would be covered by the system of 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  Estreicher notes that employers 
do not know ahead of time who will be claimants, and therefore 
should want to include all employees in the agreement.102  However, 
if Estreicher is correct in assuming that well-paid employees are the 
ones with the high-value claims, the employer will have an incentive 
                                                        
101 The choice of Cadillac has particular rhetorical effects.  It symbolizes 
flashy, conspicuous consumption.  In his well-known description of welfare 
fraud, former president Ronald Reagan described a welfare queen who 
drove to pick up her checks in a Cadillac.  See DAVID ZUCCHINO, MYTH OF 
THE WELFARE QUEEN (1999). 
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to get the highly-paid into arbitration and leave the poorly-paid out.  
The employer has no obligation to offer the pre-dispute agreement to 
everyone.  So why wouldnt the employer just offer the pre-dispute 
agreement to those employees likely to have Cadillacs?  Indeed, 
one would expect different employers to have different incentives.  
Those with a highly-paid, white collar workforce would have the 
incentive to adopt a pre-dispute agreement, while those with a 
lower-paid, less legally aware workforce would not.  If this happens, 
wed be trading a Cadillac-and-rickshaw system for a Saturn-and-
rickshaw system. 
 Ultimately, I think that Estreichers ideas would find their 
best fulfillment in a system of court-supervised arbitration or even 
labor courts.  Such a system would be mandatory, and thus would 
not allow for the opt-out possibilities described above.  It would have 
a uniform set of required procedures, which would eliminate 
employer opportunism in the design of the system.  At the same 
time, it would utilize many of the aspects of arbitration that 
Estreicher finds so attractive: lower costs, quicker decisions, and 
better access for poorer claimants.  Such system may eventually be 
created.  In the meantime, it is difficult to say whether private 
arbitration agreements have implemented Estreichers Saturns for 
rickshaws vision .103 
 3. Eliminating or reducing precautionary costs.  Another 
potential for ex ante efficiency gains would come from the reduction 
                                                        
103 Steven Shavell makes a variation on Estreichers argument by noting that 
pre-dispute arbitration could be constructed to encourage more 
employment-related suits by subsidizing the costs of bringing an action.  
Shavell, supra note SS1, at 7.  In an example, Shavell posits a manufacturing 
example in which precautionary costs are trivial, but the costs of bringing a 
suit are extremely high  higher, in fact, than the expected return of the suit.  
Thus, the precautionary measures would not be taken since suits would be 
too costly to bring.  Id. at 7 n.10.  A process that allowed the buyers to bring 
a suit inexpensively would encourage the seller to make the inexpensive 
precautions.  As Shavell admits, such an ADR system would effectively 
have to encourage[] suit (for example, by subsidizing it).  Employees and 
employers could create an arbitration agreement that provided cheaper 
costs for employees and higher penalties against employers.  As I argue 
above, however, employees lack the information necessary to craft such an 






 EFFICIENCY OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS       50 
of precautionary measures that an employer might take to prevent 
employment law violations.  As discussed earlier, Keith Hylton has 
explained how the potential for litigation may induce employers to 
make efforts to prevent such claims from arising in the first place.104  
Such efforts involve costs.  If these precautionary efforts are 
sufficiently expensive, and litigation is expensive for both the 
employer and employee, an employer may wish to buy out an 
employees employment law rights ahead of time.  In this way, the 
employer can refrain from taking precautions and not worry about 
litigation.  The employee is satisfied because he or she has received 
more, in expected value, than he or she would have from keeping the 
potential causes of action.105  Steven Shavell has made a similar 
point.106 
 Essentially, Hyltons argument for pre-dispute agreements is 
the same as his argument for pre-dispute waivers: parties may decide 
that it is more efficient to agree ahead of time to bar or water down 
claims rather than allow them to be litigated once they arise.  As 
Hylton points out, a biased arbitration agreement may serve the 
same ends as a waiver  in both cases, the plaintiff is effectively 
barred from pursuing compensation for her claim.107  But Hylton 
does not share the same aversion to waivers as the Supreme Court.  
Instead, Hylton believes that waiver agreements can enhance the 
joint wealth of the parties, and therefore parties should be permitted 
to waive their rights.  As he notes: The existence of a biased arbitral 
forum, rather than being a sign of contract failure, may be evidence 
that the parties would have chosen to enter into a waiver agreement 
had that option been legally available.108 
 Certainly, it is theoretically possible for two parties with 
perfect information to reach efficient agreements to waive their 
                                                        
104 See Hylton, supra note H1, at 218. 
105 See id. at 220-22. 
106 As Steven Shavell noted: It could be that, given the applicable law, too 
many actions would be brought in the sense that they would absorb 
resources in the form of dispute resolution costs but not produce any (or, 
more generally, much) benefit in behavior.  In such a case, the two sides 
would elect to make an ADR agreement that reduces the frequency of 
disputes.  Shavell, supra note SS1, at 7. 
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prospective disputes or subject their disputes to an arbitral forum.  
However, as discussed in Part I, I have substantial doubts that 
employees ever have the kind of information they would need to 
make such agreements.  Hylton notes that he makes rather heroic 
assumptions regarding the parties abilities to foresee events and 
to calculate the costs and benefits of various decisions.109  However, 
he has greater faith in the parties ultimate ability to get the 
information they need for these decisions.  I discussed these 
differences at greater length in Part I.110  Here, however, I want to 
question another of his assumptions: that employers could eliminate 
significant precautionary costs if allowed to waive or water down 
employment law claims through arbitration.  The notion of 
precautionary costs is familiar from the realm of negligence, where 
Learned Hands famous B < PL formula dictates that negligence only 
occurs when the potential for damage exceeds the costs of 
precautions.111  If the burden of precautionary costs is greater that the 
damage those costs are designed to prevent, then it is inefficient to 
take such precautions, even if injuries result.  However, negligence is 
essentially the law of accidents: the injurer has no intention to injure 
the victim.  Employment law, on the other hand, concerns acts which 
are generally intentional: discrimination, harassment, or failure to 
meet some minimum standard of pay or workplace safety.  What 
exactly would the precautions be in the employment law context?  
Perhaps employee monitoring, workplace training, and human 
resource personnel could be considered such costs.  But these are all 
efforts to eliminate or mitigate intentional acts.  Society understands 
that a certain level of manufacturing imperfections is inevitable and 
even necessary (at least in the short run), but we would prefer a 
world entirely without racial or age discrimination.  Sexual 
harassment is not an inevitable side-effect of productive enterprise. 
 Ultimately, my main concern with Hyltons argument is his 
belief that the information difficulties can be overcome.  Even if they 
could be overcome, however, I question whether his precautionary 
costs would ever be so significant as to warrant a waiver or a biased 
                                                        
109 Id. at 226. 
110 See supra note 81. 
111 See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see 
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arbitration agreement, especially given societys distaste for 
discrimination.112 
 4. Stronger deterrence through more accurate adjudication.  The 
flip side of Hyltons reduction of precautionary costs argument is 
that arbitration could actually heighten precautionary costs by 
adjudicating certain claims more effectively.  Under this scenario, 
discussed by Shavell113 as well as Drahozal and Hylton,114 a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement will be efficient if (a) there is a 
potential for breach of contract which will save one party money, but 
make the other party worse off; (b) courts are unable to detect or 
punish such breaches properly, while arbitrators can do so more 
effectively; and therefore (c) without an arbitration agreement, the 
receiving party will only pay the value of contract as breached (if at 
all), while with an arbitration agreement, the party will be willing to 
pay for the value of full performance.  Under this scenario, the 
parties will act more efficiently if they are able to enforce a pre-
dispute arbitration clause.  Essentially, the argument is this: if parties 
can create a system which will better enforce their contractual 
obligations, then it is efficient to allow them to do so.115 
 In theory, such a situation could arise in the employment 
context.  For example, we would have to assume that company X 
                                                        
112 Cf.Mary Ann Case, Developing a Taste for Not Being Discriminated Against, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 2273 (2003). 
113 Shavell, supra note SS1, at 5-6. 
114 Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation 
and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 
551-61 (2003). 
115 See Shavell, supra note SS1, at 5-6.  Shavell uses the example of two 
parties contracting for the sale of some good or service.  The value of good 
performance to the buyer is $1000, while the value of substandard 
performance is $500.  Full performance will cost the seller $400, but 
substandard performance will cost $300, saving him $100.  In this example, 
both parties are better off if substandard performance can be discouraged, 
but the seller will engage in substandard production if the chance of getting 
caught is low.  If arbitrators are much better at detecting substandard 
performance than courts, then both sides would be better off if they agreed 
to arbitration at the onset of the agreement.  And the seller would not agree 
to post-dispute arbitration, since at that point it wants to avoid detection.  
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could prevent employee harassment relatively cheaply, but it had no 
incentive to do so because courts consistently declined to find them 
guilty of harassment.116  However, X realizes that employees hate 
harassment and will be more productive on the job if they are not 
subjected to it.  Thus, X agrees to set up a generous arbitration 
agreement with savvy arbitrators who will be able to root out 
harassment.  This system will compel the company to take the 
precautions necessary to prevent the harassment in the first place. 
 The hypothetical above displays one reason why the better 
deterrence argument may be inapplicable in the employee context.  
The example posited by Shavell assumes that parties will be locked 
in to the contract and will be unable to draw on past relations.117  
The threat of arbitration is necessary to compel the one party not to 
shirk its contractual duties.  But if the parties contemplate not one 
but instead a series of contracts, then the potential shirker will choose 
not to shirk in order to maintain the relationship.  Similarly, in the 
employment context, the employer need not construct a super-
responsive arbitration system in order to create the proper 
precautionary incentives.  It can instead simply enact the precautions 
themselves in order to retain its employees and spur them to greater 
production.  After all, the employer knows that if employees are 
harassed, they are free to leave.  Adding a level of super-arbitration 
to enforce anti-harassment measures would create an unnecessary 
cost. 
 Additionally, it seems unlikely that employees and employers 
are forming these agreements in order to increase the deterrence of 
statutory violations.  First, if employees were eager for more 
deterrence, they would presumably be the more active party in 
pursuing such agreements.  However, employers seem to be the ones 
pushing for such agreements.118  Second, arbitrators are not likely to 
be more accurate in assessing the validity of statutory claims than 
                                                        
116 We may assume that the courts do a poor job of uncovering harassment, 
but the assumptions do not really change if we assume that courts just have 
a restrictive definition of harassment. 
117 See Shavell, supra note SS1, at 6. 
118 See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, Some Workers Lost Right to File Suit for Bias at 
Work, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1994, at A1, B-6 (discussing how employers are 
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courts.  In their article on arbitration in the context of franchise 
agreements, Drahozal and Hylton emphasize the benefits of having 
specialized arbitrators interpret complicated or indefinite contractual 
terms.119  The arbitrators employed in the collective-bargaining 
context are also thought to possess insight and experience that enable 
them to better manage disputes between unions and employers.120  
However, in both cases the arbitrator is interpreting (and, over time, 
reinterpreting) provisions of a particular contract.121  In the non-
union setting, however, arbitrators are instead primarily called upon 
to interpret statutes, regulations, and other provisions of law.  
Arbitrators do not have the same type of information advantage over 
the law that they do over a particular contract.  In fact, one frequent 
criticism of non-union employment arbitration is that arbitrators do 
not properly apply the law.122  The lack of published arbitral opinions 
makes arbitration outcomes even more uncertain.  Overall, 
arbitration would seem to be a less certain route for enforcement, 
which decreases, not increases, efficiency.123  Third, as I discussed 
earlier, even if it is possible, as Estreicher argues, that arbitration 
increases the number of claims brought against the employer, those 
                                                        
119 Drahozal & Hylton, supra note DH1, at 558. 
120 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 
363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the 
same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a 
grievance [as an arbitrator], because he cannot be similarly informed.). 
121 Even when such arbitrators are determining whether an employee was 
fired for discriminatory motives, they are determining whether the 
contractual for-cause provisions have been violated, rather than whether 
Title VII has been violated.  See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, 
Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment 
Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1205 
(1993) (The arbitrator at all times . . . is interpreting and applying the 
contract.). 
122 See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1477 (1997) (noting 
that the competence of arbitrators to analyze and decide purely legal issues 
in connection with statutory claims has been questioned). 
123 See Drahozal & Hylton, supra note DH1, at 559 (Indeed, arbitration may 
reduce the deterrence benefit if the parties are uncertain as to how the 
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claims would be smaller and would not necessarily increase the 
deterrence of prohibited activity.   
 5. Economies of scale.   Another potential justification for a pre-
dispute agreement could be an economies-of-scale argument.  
Developing a system of arbitration incurs costs.  The employer must 
first decide whether it would prefer arbitration to litigation  a 
decision that should require some information gathering and 
processing.  Then, the system must be developed: the procedural 
rules, the potential pool of arbitrators, the locations for the 
arbitrations, and many other details.  Generally such development 
will require the assistance of counsel.  Then, once the system has 
been constructed, the employer must establish some method of 
administering its processes.  Employees must perform such duties of 
accepting forms, arranging pre-arbitration meetings, and 
maintaining the arbitrator pool, or an outside agency must be paid to 
do these things.  In many ways, the employer is responsible for 
creating and maintaining its own system of justice, and must provide 
many of the services that public employees provide in the court 
system. 
 It would be difficult for an employer to develop such a 
system after a dispute has arisen.  The employer would have to pour 
resources into a potential arbitration system while at the same time 
pursuing litigation.  Under the pre-dispute system, the employer 
knows that resources devoted to developing the arbitration system 
will be fruitfully spent.  In addition, each employee might have his or 
her own set of requirements before agreeing to the arbitration.  Since 
each employee would have veto power over the arbitration, the 
parties might spend a good deal of time haggling over the details.  
Moreover, if only a few employees eventually opted to choose 
arbitration, the employer could not spread its costs over a large pool 
of disputes. It might not make economic sense for an employer to 
provide for arbitration if it cannot guarantee that all its disputes will 
be funneled through that system.124 
 There are two potential responses to this economies-of-scale 
difficulty.  First, an employer could develop a system of arbitration 
                                                        
124 See Estreicher, Predispute Agreements, supra note E2, at 1358-59 (arguing 
that a dispute-resolution system is a public good which must be provided 
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but only ask employees to agree to it after the dispute has arisen.  As 
noted in Part I, if arbitration is more economically efficient than 
litigation, the parties will bargain and ultimately agree to it.  The 
employee might require some form of compensation in return for 
agreeing to the arbitration, but the employer could provide the 
compensation and still be better off.  Nothing prevents an employer 
from developing an efficient system of arbitration and proposing its 
use after the dispute has arisen.  Second, the costs of developing an 
arbitration system may be going down, as more groups provide off-
the-rack arbitration processes.  It may be easier and less expensive 
for an employer to simply sign on with a group like the American 
Arbitration Association and adopts its rules, procedures, and pool of 
arbitrators.  Employees and their representatives are also more likely 
to know about a system developed by a national organization, and 
may therefore be less concerned about the fairness of the 
proceedings.  Commentators have also proposed their own versions 
of a uniform or model arbitration procedure for parties to use.125  
These developments are all likely to reduce the costs required in 
developing an arbitral system. 
 Nevertheless, employers may be hesitant to invest any funds 
in an arbitral system which employees will not embrace.  It is 
possible that employees could reject arbitration even if it is their 
economic best interest.  This possibility is discussed below. 
 
B. Prevention of Irrational Post-Dispute Arbitration Rejection 
 A number of commentators argue that parties will never 
agree to post-dispute arbitration because plaintiffs and defendants 
have different sets of incentives.126  One forum will always have 
advantages for one side that are disadvantages for the other.  
However, as discussed above, economic theory teaches that the 
parties will not be stuck with the default option if another option is 
more efficient.  Instead, the parties will bargain to reach the most 
efficient alternative.  Thus, if the employee would prefer litigation, 
but the employer would choose arbitration, the parties would 
bargain to reach the most efficient result.  If arbitration is more 
efficient, the employer will provide some incentive for the employee 
                                                        
125 See, e.g., Sherwyn, Tracey & Eigen, supra note S1, at 125-28. 
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to agree to it; if litigation is more efficient, the employee will reject 
the employers offer and stay with the default setting.127 
 Of course, not all transactions operate as smoothly in practice 
as they do in theory.  Part I described why pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements may have trouble meeting the perfect information 
requirement of the Coase Theorem.  Post-dispute agreements are less 
complicated, and the necessary information is more attainable.  
However, informational problems could also arise in the post-
dispute context.  For example, employees and their representatives 
could overestimate the degree of employer bias that arbitrators 
would exhibit, leading them to undervalue the arbitration option.  Or 
employers might overestimate their chances of success before a jury, 
leading them to overvalue litigation.  Looking at all the factors, the 
parties could have less that perfect information about the probability 
of success in each forum (Pl and Pa), the likely relief granted in each 
forum (Rl and Ra), and the costs of litigating in each forum (Cl and 
Ca).  In fact, parties will most certainly lack perfect information about 
these factors.  If both parties had perfect information about Pl, Rl, and 
Cl, they would be able to settle every time. 
 Of course, as noted in Part I, a large percentage of cases do 
settle.  And the information available at the post-dispute stage is 
certainly better than the information at the pre-dispute stage.  
Nevertheless, if parties routinely either lack the appropriate 
information or make false assumptions about that information, they 
may routinely make inefficient decisions.  In the employment 
context, parties may routinely make inefficient decisions not to 
choose post-dispute arbitration based on either a lack of data or 
misinformation about arbitration and litigation.  If, in fact, choosing 
arbitration is always or generally the most efficient option, then pre-
dispute arbitration agreements may in fact lead to more efficient 
results.  The parties might be choosing the most efficient result in the 
dark, but they would be getting there nonetheless. 
                                                        
127 Thus, it is insufficient to simply assert that post-dispute arbitration 
agreements will never take place because one side will always prefer 
litigation to arbitration.  See, e.g., Sherwyn, supra note S2, at 63.  Both parties 
may begin with different preferences, but if they have perfect information, 
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 What might lead parties to reject post-dispute arbitration 
inefficiently?  One plausible story is that employees and their 
attorneys overestimate their likelihood of success in litigation and 
underestimate their likelihood of success before an arbitrator.  Such 
misperceptions could be based on several factors.  First, employees 
and their representatives might lack information about the arbitral 
process.  Arbitration is a private form of dispute resolution, and the 
results are generally kept between the parties.  Hard data, such as 
information about an arbitrators record of adjudication, or soft 
data, such as information about the arbitrators personal quirks and 
biases, may be hard to find or unavailable.  In the absence of 
information, employees and their representatives might conclude 
that arbitration is more employer-friendly than it actually is.  And 
they therefore would demand a higher price to accept it  a price that 
the employer would find inefficient. 
Second, employees and their representatives might be subject 
to some of the decisionmaking heuristics described in Part I.  For 
example, employees might suffer from optimism bias in perceiving 
their likelihood of success in litigation.  They might focus on the 
likelihood that they will win the maximum amount of damages at 
trial, and irrationally discount their likelihood of failure, as well as 
the costs of trial.  Just as employees can be overly optimistic about 
their likelihood of termination, they can be overly optimistic about 
their likelihood of litigation success.  Moreover, parties may be 
subject to the self-serving bias, a term for the tendency of parties to 
interpret facts and events in a way to confirm their pre-existing 
beliefs.128  This bias leads to a divergence between plaintiffs and 
defendants over the likelihood of the claims success.129  This bias 
could lead to plaintiffs overvaluing their chance of success in 
litigation, thereby skewing the results of their comparison with 
arbitration.130 
                                                        
128 See infra Part I.C.2. 
129 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note KU1, at 1094 (Evidence of the self-
serving bias in the analysis of lawsuits suggests . . . that plaintiffs (and 
defendants) will systematically anticipate their trial prospects as being 
better than defendants (and plaintiffs) believe.). 
130 Plaintiffs might also overvalue their chance of success at arbitration, but 
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In addition, the behavioral characteristic known as the 
endowment effect might affect employee perceptions.  The 
endowment effect refers to the psychological phenomenon in which 
individuals value what they have more than what they do not have.  
In a famous131 experiment, researchers gave half of the participants a 
mug.132  The researchers then independently asked those with the 
mug how much money they would want for it, and asked those 
without the mug how much they would pay for it.  Those with the 
mugs wanted significantly more for the mugs than the others were 
willing to pay for the mugs.133  The researchers concluded that there 
was an endowment effect  namely, people valued the mug that they 
had more than the mug that they did not.  In other words, people 
will require more money to part with something than they would 
pay to get it in the first place.134 
 The endowment effect causes problems for economic theory, 
because economics assumes that a persons utility for a certain good 
or status does not vary based on context.  The Coase theorem is 
based on the premise that parties will bargain to reach the most 
efficient result  no matter which party is endowed with the initial 
legal entitlement.  However, if people value a good or entitlement 
more highly simply because they possess it, such entitlements will be 
stickier than economic theory would predict.  The initial 
assignment of the good or right may be more difficult to bargain 
about, because the holder will be less willing to part with it.135  In 
                                                                                                                                  
note E1, at 563 (discussing high litigation prospects as Cadillacs and 
arbitration prospects as Saturns). 
131 Now infamous? 
132 Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the 
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990). 
133 Over the course of four iterations of this study, buyers were willing to 
pay a median of between $2.25 and $2.50 for the mug, while sellers were 
willing to part with the mug for a median of $5.25. 
134 Numerous other experiments, some conducted outside the laboratory, 
have found similar evidence of the endowment effect.  See Russell Korobkin, 
The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1232-35 
(2003). 
135 One unresolved question is whether the increase in utility that 
apparently flows from having an entitlement should be counted as true 
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such a manner could the endowment effect complicate our model for 
post-dispute arbitration agreements.  Employees are endowed 
with the right to take their case to court.  Thus, when asked to choose 
between arbitration and litigation, employees may place a higher 
value on litigation, since they have the right in hand.  The 
endowment effect complicates our expectation that employers and 
employees will be able to bargain to reach the most efficient result. 
The lack of information, coupled with potential behavioral 
tendencies, may dampen or completely quash efforts by parties to 
reach post-dispute arbitration agreements.  Particularly when 
combined with the start-up costs necessary to arbitrate, these factors 
may lead to litigation when arbitration would have been the more 
efficient result.  Although we do not know how many parties agree 
to post-dispute arbitration, limited studies and anecdotal evidence 
indicate that such agreements are rare in the employment context.136  
However, if there are in fact only a small number of parties that agree 
to arbitration after a dispute has arisen, there are several possible 
explanations for this.  First, the parties might be acting efficiently: 
arbitration might not provide the cost savings that its proponents 
proclaim.  Second, the start-up costs may be too high for parties to 
pursue arbitration on an ad hoc, post-dispute basis.  Third, parties 
might lack the information to properly evaluate the post-dispute 
arbitration possibilities, and they may make improper assumptions 
about the costs and benefits of arbitration and litigation.  Finally, the 
parties could be irrationally rejecting arbitration based on behavioral 
heuristics. 
                                                                                                                                  
require $5.25 to part with it, is the mug worth $2.50 or $5.25 to me, in terms 
of utility?  This problem is not as important in the litigation-arbitration 
context, since both litigation and arbitration are simply means to an end and 
not intrinsically valuable.  However, plaintiffs may put a value on having 
their day in court which could be exacerbated by the endowment effect. 
136 David Sherwyn studied the arbitration program available through the 
Illinois Human Rights Commission from 1994 to 1998.  Although the 
Commission did not keep precise records of the number of parties using the 
arbitration program, Sherwyn surmised (using available records and 
anecdotal evidence) that somewhere between zero and one percent of the 
claims filed with the IHRC went to arbitration.  See Sherwyn, supra note S2, 
at 62.  A similarly small number used the IHRCs mediation program.  See 
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Although it is impossible to know at this point why post-
dispute agreements are rare in the employment context, one potential 
reason  a lack of information about arbitration  may not be a long-
term impediment.  As noted in Part I.A, the information necessary to 
evaluate a post-dispute arbitration agreement is the type of 
information that attorneys must evaluate all the time.  Certainly, not 
every case settles, but attorneys must constantly assess the P, R and C 
of litigation to determine when and at which price it makes sense to 
settle.  Currently, it is harder to determine the P, R and C of 
arbitration.  Arbitrations are generally private, and parties can create 
their own unique systems, making comparisons difficult.  However, 
as organizations like the American Arbitration Association become 
more popular, arbitration processes and procedures will become 
more of a known quantity.137  Moreover, these groups are 
endeavoring to provide more information about the results of 
arbitrations (in redacted form), so that evaluations of arbitrators 
themselves can be made.138  As arbitration becomes a more popular 
option, more information will be available, the process will have 
greater transparency, and parties will be able to make better 
decisions.139 
Moreover, there is reason to doubt that behavioral heuristics 
are leading to a significant number of inefficient decisions in the 
                                                        
137 See, e.g., JAMS Guide to Dispute Resolution for Employment Programs 
and Sample Clause Language, available at: 
http://www.jamsadr.com/employment_clauses.asp;  
138 See, e.g., American Arbitration Association's Employment Awards 
Database, available at: http://www.adr.org/AAAAwards/  (containing 
redacted awards from employment cases, but available only to members). 
139 Of course, one reason arbitration may become more popular is the 
increasing number of pre-dispute agreements.  In the absence of pre-dispute 
agreements, the initial costs of developing and popularizing a post-dispute 
arbitration might have been prohibitive.  Thus, there is something of a path 
dependence to litigation: because litigation is (currently) the societally-
created option, more people use it, and there is more information generated 
about it than any potentially more efficient alternative.  For more on path 
dependence, see PAUL KRUGMAN, PEDDLING PROSPERITY (1994).  But see Stan 
Leibowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Policy and Path Dependence: From QWERTY 







 EFFICIENCY OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS       62 
post-dispute context.  Certainly, the optimism bias might work its 
effects on individual plaintiffs, and the endowment effect might lead 
to a plaintiff preference for litigation.  However, in the context of 
most post-dispute situations, the employee-plaintiff will have the 
advice of counsel.  Attorneys are regular and repeat market 
participants.  Unlike occasional participants, who fall back on 
heuristics to deal with uncertain and unfamiliar decisions, attorneys 
must make rational calculations in order to be successful in their 
practice.  In the pre-dispute context, the employee generally will not 
have the advice of counsel.  Without such assistance, the employee is 
more likely to fall back onto heuristics in making a decision. 
Attorneys are certainly subject to the optimism bias, the self-
serving bias, and the endowment effect, and they might therefore 
demand too high a price for agreeing to post-dispute arbitration.  
However, these biases also affect attorneys decisions to settle cases.  
Thus, decisions not to go to arbitration should be no more 
systematically inefficient than decisions not to settle.  If there are any 
particular inefficiencies in the post-dispute arbitration context, I 
would suspect they stem from attorney prejudices about arbitration 
based on lack of information.  One would not be surprised to find 
plaintiffs attorneys suspicious of arbitration agreements.  In fact, a 
recent survey of Chicago employment attorneys found that both 
plaintiffs and defense attorneys thought arbitrators were biased in 
favor of the other side.140  There are, of course, a number of 
explanations for this data: one side is wrong; one side is lying; both 
sides are overly pessimistic.  But both sides might also be ignorant.  
We distrust what we do not understand.  As I will discuss further in 
Part III, courts and legislatures could take steps to eliminate some of 
the potential inefficiencies caused by a lack of information.  But as I 
noted earlier, I do not think this problem is as severe, in terms of its 
efficiency consequences, as the information problem in the pre-
dispute context. 
 
C. Reduction of Societal Externalities (or, Greater Societal Efficiency) 
 A third potential argument for pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements is that they reduce externalities caused by litigation and 
                                                        
140 See Sherwyn, supra note S2, at 42.  Both groups of attorneys agreed, 






 EFFICIENCY OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS       63 
thereby increase societal efficiency.  Below I discuss two versions of 
this argument: (1) pre-dispute agreements increase efficiency by 
watering down employment law claims, and (2) pre-dispute 
agreements increase efficiency by reducing societal litigation costs. 
 1. Diluting employment law claims.  Thus far we have assumed 
that it is efficient for employees to have the legal protections they are 
entitled to.  If employment law claims represent a net societal 
inefficiency, however, then societal efficiency would be improved by 
diminishing or eliminating these claims.  For example, if Title VII 
claims ultimately end up costing society more than they create in 
benefits, then society would be better off if Title VII claims were 
eliminated.  The most direct way to do this, of course, would be 
repealing Title VII.  But less direct methods could also have an effect.  
If, as critics claim, pre-dispute arbitration agreements are a way for 
employers to elude some of their Title VII liability, then such 
agreements are a method for diluting the inefficient effects of Title 
VII.  The more biased the agreement, the better.  By effectively acting 
as a waiver, biased pre-dispute agreements could dilute or eliminate 
employment law liability and thereby improve societal efficiency. 
 Although I have not found any proponents of pre-dispute 
arbitration who make the previous claim, one criticism of the current 
system of employment law litigation has been that the system is 
biased against employers and too permissive towards frivolous 
suits.141  If the system is too corrupt, it would arguably be inefficient 
to maintain it.  However, certainly no courts have justified pre-
                                                        
141 For example, David Sherwyn chastises critics of pre-dispute arbitration 
who support the current system of litigation. 
These critics do not, however, even acknowledge that the 
current system may be unjust.  They do not discuss the fact 
that merit is not the driving force in determining the 
resolution of a case.  They do not mention that high cost of 
defense associated with litigation results in incidences of 
"de facto severance" and other forms of systemic leveraging 
to extort settlement for claims with no merit.  These 
individuals may not care about employers' costs of defense 
or the fact that arbitration reduces incidence of "de facto 
severance" and other forms of systemic leveraging to extort 
settlement for claims with no merit. 
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dispute arbitration on this basis; if anything, courts have stressed that 
arbitration should have little or no effect on the underlying 
resolution of employment law claims.142  Because this subject is 
beyond the scope of this analysis, I will leave it for other 
commentators.143 
 2. Reducing societal litigation costs.  Our model for pre- and 
post-dispute arbitration agreements has focused solely on the 
employee and the employer.  And we have declared an agreement to 
be efficient if it maximizes the utility of the two parties.  However, 
we have not taken into account whether the two parties might create 
external costs that would lead to greater societal inefficiency but 
would be ignored by the parties themselves.  In other words, do 
decisions to arbitrate or litigate create societal externalities?  And do 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements reduce or increase the incidence 
or significance of these externalities? 
 The most obvious externality created by a decision to litigate 
is the costs of running the judicial system.  Although parties are 
obliged to pay filing fees, these minimal fees do not cover the costs of 
running the judicial system.  Judges, clerks, court clerks, 
administrative staff, security personnel, and building maintenance 
staff must all be paid.144  Building construction or rental costs are 
incurred, as are costs for office supplies, computer systems, and the 
                                                        
142 See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295 n.10 (2002) ([F]ederal 
statutory claims may be the subject of arbitration agreements . . . because the 
agreement only determines the choice of forum.); Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane, Inc., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) ("By agreeing to 
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights 
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, 
rather than a judicial, forum." (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))). 
143 For more on this issue, see John Donahue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1411 (1986), and Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title 
VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513 (1987). 
144 In 2002, Congress allocated a budget of $4.6 billion to the federal 
judiciary.  See Leonidas Ralph Meacham, Annual Report of the Director, 
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other standard necessities for a white-collar workplace.145  Juries 
must be selected and paid.  The court systems (and thereby the 
taxpayers) absorb most of these costs,146 minus the small amount they 
receives in fees.  These costs represent a significant additional set of 
burdens that society must shoulder in order to maintain the 
availability of litigation.  If the parties choose arbitration, then the 
parties pay for these costs.  Since the parties need not worry about 
the societal costs of litigation, they are apt to ignore them  creating 
an externality. 
 By way of example, let us go back to our post-dispute model.  
As we noted, each party will choose arbitration over litigation if: 
 
Pa*Ra  Ca > Pl*Rl - Cl 
 
For purposes of making a simple example, lets assume that the 
employee has a 70 percent chance of winning $10,000 both in 
litigation and arbitration.  In arbitration, the costs would be $500 for 
each party; however, in litigation they would be $400.  Since the costs 
of litigation are higher than the costs of arbitration for each party, the 
parties would both choose litigation over arbitration.147   
However, this model leaves out an important variable: the 
costs of litigation to society.  Up until this point, all costs in our 
model have been absorbed by the employee and the employer.  Thus, 
what was efficient for them jointly has been efficient for society as a 
whole.  But the parties do not have to absorb all of the costs of 
litigating a case, and therefore may not take them into account when 
deciding on the most efficient option.  As noted above, the parties 
would ultimately make their choice based on what is most efficient 
between them, represented by this equation: 
 
Pa*Ra  JCa > Pl*Rl - JCl 
 
                                                        
145 Since 1985 Congress has appropriated more than $5 billion for 
courthouse construction.  See id. at 2. 
146 Individual jurors also absorb costs  namely, the opportunity costs of 
whatever they would have done if they had not been selected for jury duty. 
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JC is the joint costs of both parties.148  However, from societys 
standpoint, arbitration would be more efficient than litigation when 
this equation is satisfied: 
 
Pa*Ra  JCa > Pl*Rl  JCl  SCl 
 
In this equation, SCl represents the social costs of litigation.  If SCl is 
greater than zero, then there may be some cases in which the parties 
will choose litigation even when, from societys perspective, it would 
be more efficient for the parties to choose arbitration.  Going back to 
our example above, lets assume that if the parties took the case to 
court, the court system would incur a cost of another $500 processing 
the case and administering the trial.149  If we add up the costs to both 
parties as well as to the court system, arbitration clearly is more 
efficient.150  However, the parties do not absorb these costs, and 
therefore would choose litigation.  Their choice would be efficient as 
between the two of them, but inefficient from a societal viewpoint. 
 Perhaps a view to societal efficiency is one reason many 
courts have been eager to uphold pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  
After all, courts know better than anyone else the societal costs that 
litigation incurs.151  Instead of imagining yourself as an employee, 
imagine yourself as a federal judge.  You know your docket has a 
substantial number of employment-related cases.  These cases often 
revolve around questions of fact rather than questions of law, and the 
stakes are small compared with heady constitutional questions or 
                                                        
148 As noted above in Part I.A, the parties will bargain to choose the most 
efficient result, even if the parties have differing expenses for each process. 
149 This $1000 figure represents the expected cost of the litigation, since we 
would know ahead of time whether the case would get to trial. 
150 Arbitrations total costs would be $500 + $500 = $1000.  Litigations total 
costs would be $400 + $400 + $500 = $1300. 
151 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 
237 (1996) (One substitute for federal judicial services is arbitration, so it is 
not surprising that the federal courts have become increasingly hospitable to 
arbitration.); Cole, supra note RC1, at 449 (Taking the task into their own 
hands, judges, in an attempt to reduce their workload without increasing 
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complex business transactions.152  Along comes a new avenue for 
these claims  a method of dispute resolution that is familiar to 
judges from the union context.153  The parties  or often just the 
employer  absorb most of the costs of this new system.154  
Theoretically, this system could be a cheaper and more accurate 
method of resolving difficult employment dispute, and the costs are 
borne directly by the litigants.  From an efficiency (as well as an 
institutional) perspective, pre-dispute agreements would seem fairly 
attractive. 
 Of course, litigation costs are not purely deadweight.  Most of 
the benefits from litigation are ex ante, in that the potential for 
litigation deters parties from engaging in illegal conduct.  If an 
arbitration system failed to enforce a partys rights in the same 
manner as the judicial system, society would lose efficiency as illegal 
behavior increased.  Just as the costs of litigation are compared with 
the costs of arbitration, the deterrence effects of litigation must be 
balanced against the deterrence effects of arbitration.  If arbitration is 
too biased toward employers, such that employers feel more free to 
engage in prohibited activities or reduce their precautionary 
measures, societal costs from increased illegal activity will increase  
and may overtake the institutional cost savings.155  Thus, if courts 
were attracted to arbitration as a method of increasing social 
                                                        
152 See Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of 
Statutory Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 293, 306 (These [cases 
founded on employment disputes] are often tedious cases, involving angry 
parties and mostly fact-bound disagreements.  It is not the kind of litigation 
that most judges prefer to manage.). 
153 Arbitration has long been a staple in the union context, and the Supreme 
Court has long upheld wide powers for arbitrators in the collective 
bargaining context.  See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 
363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car 
Co., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960); United Steelworkers v.  American Mfg. Co., 363 
U.S. 564 (1960) (together known as the Steelworkers Trilogy). 
154 An important issue in pre-dispute arbitration agreements is whether the 
employer must bear the costs of the arbitration.  See discussion infra. 
155 Cf. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 658 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that certain types of provisions may undermine[] the deterrent 
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efficiency, they would need to maintain a level of fairness for the 
arbitral process sufficient to keep a proper level of deterrence. 
Some commentators have pointed to another potential cost of 
arbitration  the loss of judicial decisions on critical issues in the law.  
Arbitration agreements often keep the results of any particular 
arbitration a secret.  Not all agreements require written decisions; for 
those that do, the parties may place restrictions on their ability to 
publicize such opinions.  As more disputes are diverted into 
arbitration, there will be fewer litigated cases, and thus fewer 
published decisions.  The end result will be a sparser and poorer 
legal landscape, where statutory rights remain stagnant and the law 
does not adapt to societal change.156  It is difficult to measure the 
costs and benefits from judicial decisions at a societal level.  
Certainly, such decisions have important benefits  they provide 
further explication and development of the law.  Law without 
written opinions would be hard to fathom.  And many of the 
employment laws  particularly the Americans with Disabilities Act 
 are relatively new and require a great deal of judicial exegesis.  
However, judicial decisions also have costs, for both the parties and 
society.  Settlement is generally considered the most efficient way of 
resolving a dispute.  There may be some ratio of societal disputes to 
judicial opinions that maintains the optimal level of growth in the 
law, but I know of no research that has attempted to generate such a 
number.  Moreover, the law would continue to develop even under a 
system where pre-dispute arbitration agreements are enforced.  Not 
all employers or employees will enter into pre-dispute agreements.  
The EEOC can still bring suits on behalf of individual employees to 
assert their federal employment law rights, even if those employees 
are covered by an arbitration agreement.157  Through its claim intake 
process, the EEOC can select those cases which raise novel issues of 
law and insure that the issues receive a judicial hearing.158  Finally, if 
these mitigating factors are deemed insufficient, society could permit 
                                                        
156 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1086-87 (1984). 
157 See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002). 
158 See Estreicher, supra note E2, at 1356 (noting that greater use of arbitration 
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courts to review arbitration decisions that concerned novel issues of 
law.159 
 Ultimately, I think the issue of societal efficiency presents the 
most persuasive argument for pre-dispute arbitration.  By enforcing 
pre-dispute agreements, the courts have overseen the creation of a 
new system of dispute resolution paid for by the parties themselves.  
If the arbitral forum is truly as fair as its proponents submit, then 
society gets a cheaper form of adjudication without any 
corresponding loss in deterrence.  Of course, whether pre-dispute 
agreements are generally fair is a subject still open to investigation.  
Given the potential for employer opportunism, I would hesitate to 
suggest such agreements are fair without substantial evidence.  
 
 
III: THOUGHTS ON THE NEXT GENERATION OF DEBATE 
 
 Critics of predispute arbitration agreements generally focus 
on the potential for unfair arbitration procedures in their attacks.  In 
some situations, unfair procedures stack the deck against employees: 
employees may have drastically shortened statutes of limitation; they 
may have to provide discovery from which the employer is exempt; 
employers may control the choice of arbitrators or the pool of 
potential arbitrators; and employers may provide themselves with 
rights of notice or appeal not provided to employees.160  Even with 
fair procedures, arbitration may arguably be titled against employees 
if the arbitrators themselves are biased.  According to some 
commentators, the repeat-player effect enables employers to have 
more familiarity with arbitrators,161 and that arbitrators may 
                                                        
159 For a suggestion in this regard, see Monica J. Washington, Note, 
Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: Judicial Review 
without Judicial Reformation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 844 (1999). 
160 An arbitration agreement required by Hooters of America contained all 
of these.  See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th 
Cir. 1999). 
161 See, e.g., Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 UMKC 
L. REV . 693, 714 (1993) ("[S]ince employers rather than individual 
employees are more likely to have repeat participation in the employment 
dispute arbitration process, arbitrators are more likely to rule in their favor 
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consciously or unconsciously favor employers since employers 
administer and often pay for the arbitration system.162   
 Now that the Supreme Court has made clear that the FAAs 
provisions apply to almost all employees,163 state and lower federal 
courts have set about the task of defining the limits of acceptable 
arbitration procedures.  But a fundamental question remains: how is 
that debate to be framed?  Will it be framed primarily by contract 
law, which focuses primarily on the voluntary agreement between 
the two parties?  Or will courts find that arbitration procedures must 
have a certain level of procedural fairness in order to protect the 
deterrent and remedial purposes of the underlying statutes?  The 
Supreme Courts Gilmer decision provides support for both 
perspectives.  On the one hand, Gilmer cites the FAA for the 
proposition that arbitration agreements should be enforced save 
upon such grounds as exist . . . for the revocation of any contract.164  
The Court noted that fraud or overwhelming economic power may 
justify contractual revocation but found such doctrines were not 
present in that case.165  On the other hand, Gilmer also makes clear 
that arbitration is only permissible if a party does not lose any 
substantive rights as a result of the agreement.166  The Court appears 
to require as a condition of arbitration that the prospective litigant 
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the 
arbitral forum.167  In this context the Court reviewed several 
procedural provisions in the arbitration agreement, such as the 
                                                                                                                                  
claims."); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of 
Public Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635, 656 (same); Alleyne, supra note 
RA1, at 426 (noting temptation for arbitrators to favor institutional 
employer interests). 
162 See Cole, supra note RC1, at 478. 
163 The Court interpreted the FAA to exclude on workers directly involved 
in interstate transportation.  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 
119 (2001). 
164 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)). 
165 Id. at 33. 
166 See id. at 26 (By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not 
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. (quoting Mitsubishi, 
473 U.S. at 628)). 
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selection of arbitrators and limitations on discovery and class actions, 
and held that there had been no showing that such procedures 
will prove insufficient for the vindication of the statutory claims.168  
As one circuit court noted, this approach is necessary to prevent 
unfair agreements that would enable employers to evade the 
requirements of federal law altogether.169  In a recent case 
concerning consumer arbitration, the Supreme Court discussed both 
perspectives as a joint test: In determining whether statutory claims 
may be arbitrated, we first ask whether the parties agreed to submit 
their claims to arbitration, and then ask whether Congress has 
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the 
statutory rights at issue.170 
 State and federal courts have considered both of these 
approaches in reviewing pre-dispute employment arbitration 
agreements.  In striking down arbitration agreements on contractual 
grounds, California and the Ninth Circuit (interpreting California 
law) have relied on the doctrine of unconscionability.171  In the 
Hooters case, the Fourth Circuit held that the arbitration agreement 
violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing.172  Some courts have 
discussed the doctrines of consideration and mutuality of 
obligation.173  However, courts have also looked to whether 
                                                        
168 Id. at  30-32. 
169 Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 658 (6th Cir. 2003). 
170 Green Tree Financial Corp.Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000). 
171 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
122 S.Ct. 2329 (2002); Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., 6 
P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).  Other courts have also discussed unconscionability in 
the context of employment arbitration agreements.  See, e.g., Alexander v. 
Anthony Intl, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 270 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding thirty-day time 
limit, restrictions on relief, and a loser pays provision to be 
unconscionable); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 666-67 
(6th Cir. 2003) (finding the agreement not to be unconscionable); Wilcox v. 
Valero Refining Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (finding the 
application of an arbitration agreement to conduct which happened before 
the agreement to be unconscionable). 
172 Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999). 
173 See, e.g., Morrison, 317 F.3d at 667-68; Harris v. Green Tree Financial 
Corp., 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999); Faber v. Menard, 267 F.Supp.2d 961, 972 
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arbitration procedures are sufficiently fair to vindicate the 
underlying substantive rights.  For example, the D.C. Circuit in Cole 
v. Burns Intl Sec. Services174 upheld an arbitration agreement based on 
the procedural fairness of the agreement.  The court set forth five 
procedural requirements for arbitral agreements and found that 
these procedures had been met in the instant case.175  Other courts 
have employed a similar effect-on-substantive-rights analysis in 
reviewing certain arbitral procedures.176 
 One procedural issue which has been analyzed under both 
contractual and substantive-rights approaches is the cost-splitting 
provision in some arbitration agreements.  Since the parties are 
paying for the entire costs of arbitration, those costs may reach 
significant levels.  Although some employers offer to pay for the bulk 
of arbitration costs in their arbitration agreements, other employers 
require that the costs of arbitration be split between the parties.  In its 
decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. Alabama v. Randolph,177 the 
Supreme Court focused primarily on the substantive-rights analysis, 
recognizing that the existence of large arbitration costs could 
preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal 
                                                        
174 105 F.3d 1465, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
175 For example, the court in Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1481 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) upheld an arbitration agreement based on the procedural 
fairness of the agreement.  The court noted: 
We believe that all of the factors addressed in Gilmer are 
satisfied here. In particular, we note that the arbitration 
arrangement (1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) 
provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a 
written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that 
would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not 
require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any 
arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to the 
arbitration forum. Thus, an employee who is made to use 
arbitration as a condition of employment effectively may 
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral 
forum. 
Id. at 1482. 
176 See, e.g., Musnick v, King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003); 
DeOrnellas v. Aspen Sq. Mgmt., 295 F. Supp. 2d 753 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
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statutory rights in the arbitral forum.178  However, the Court was 
unwilling to say that the possibility of such preclusion was enough to 
impair substantive rights.179  Ultimately, the Court adopted a case-
by-case approach to this issue, holding that parties bear the burden 
of establishing that costs will be prohibitive.180 
Lower courts have differed over whether such cost-splitting 
arrangements are generally enforceable.  Some courts have held such 
agreements unenforceable on contractual grounds.  The Ninth 
Circuit has held cost-splitting arrangements to be substantively 
unconscionable.181  Most courts, however, have followed Randolphs 
lead and analyzed such arrangements as a substantive rights issue.  
Prior to Randolph, some courts had suggested that cost splitting 
arrangements were per se unenforceable.182  After Randolph, courts 
have adopted the Courts case-by-case approach, asking claimants to 
prove that the costs of arbitration are so substantial as to deter the 
bringing of claims.183  However, courts have taken different 
positions as to what kind of costs deter claims.184  One school of 
                                                        
178 Id. at 90.  The Court resolved the contract issue in a brief sentence.  See id. 
(In this case, it is undisputed that the parties agreed to arbitrate all claims 
relating to their contract, including claims involving statutory rights.). 
179 Id. at 90-91. 
180 Id. at 92 (Similarly, we believe that where, as here, a party seeks to 
invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be 
prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the 
likelihood of incurring such costs.). 
181 See Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 785 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that a fee allocation scheme which requires the 
employee to split the arbitrator's fees with the employer would alone render 
an arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable). 
182 See, e.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Col., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 
(10th Cir. 1999); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 
(11th Cir. 1998); Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 
1997).   
183 Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th 
Cir. 2001). 
184 For a discussion of these positions in terms of the forum selection 
school versus the comparative cost of litigation school, see Michael H. 
Leroy & Peter Feuille, When is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute 
Resolution?  The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50 
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thought has held that any costs above and beyond what would have 
been assessed as court costs and filing fees deters such claims and 
therefore affects substantive rights.185   Another approach favors an 
analysis of whether the costs are actually high enough to deter the 
bringing of claims.  In this regard, the Sixth Circuit asks whether 
costs are potentially high enough to chill a class of potential 
litigants.186  The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, inquires into 
whether the actual arbitral costs in a particular instance prevent the 
particular litigant from having an adequate and accessible substitute 
forum.187  These fractured approaches have led to divergent results.  
An empirical study of reported cases on the issue found that 
appellate courts ordered arbitration in only half of the cases in which 
claimants contested cost-splitting arrangements.188 
 The framing of the analysis concerning these procedural 
issues will have a profound effect on how these issues are 
determined.  If they are scrutinized under the lens of contract law, 
the primary issue will be whether these parties reached a free and 
voluntary agreement to arbitrate under the specified circumstances.  
If they are examined for their effects on substantive rights, the issue 
becomes the actual impact of the particular procedure on the 
                                                        
185 See Armendariz, 3 P.3d at 765 (Accordingly, consistent with the majority 
of jurisdictions to consider this issue, we conclude that when an employer 
imposes mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment, the 
arbitration agreement or arbitration process cannot generally require the 
employee to bear any type of expense that the employee would not be 
required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in court.). 
186 Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 663 (6th Cir. 2003).  The 
court noted that an inquiry into the typical job description and 
socioeconomic background of potential litigant should be undertaken.  Id. 
187 See Bradford, 238 F.3d at 556 (We believe that the appropriate inquiry is 
one that evaluates whether the arbitral forum in a particular case is an 
adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, i.e., a case-by-case analysis 
that focuses, among other things, upon the claimant's ability to pay the 
arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration 
and litigation in court, and whether that cost differential is so substantial as 
to deter the bringing of claims.). 
188 See Leroy & Feuille, supra note 178, at 177.  However, district courts 
ordered arbitration in 77 percent of cases in which cost was raised as an 
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underlying arbitration.  There are reductive perils to either approach.  
If the parties have in fact both agreed to the arbitration contract, the 
effects of the actual procedures  no matter how draconian  would 
appear meaningless.  On the other hand, arbitral procedures of 
necessity have an impact on the underlying adjudication; in fact, the 
parties have theoretically chosen arbitration to take advantage of 
those procedures.  Thus, the question of effect is too simple.  
Determining whether a particular procedure has a certain level of 
effect on substantive rights  substantial effect, perhaps, or 
preclusive effect  is an exercise that is ultimately more about a 
courts view on the merits of arbitration. 
 My hope is that the model provided in Part I will provide a 
new basis for courts and commentators to analyze the contractual 
issues surrounding pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  The 
complexity of the model calls into question whether such agreements 
are based on adequate cost-benefit analyses.  Instead, it seems likely 
that employees cannot make such analyses and instead fall back onto 
decisionmaking heuristics in agreeing to arbitration.  Thus, the fact 
that both parties have agreed to the provision does not mean both 
parties have arrived at a meaningful decision that the provision will 
make them better off.  Once this uncertainty has been acknowledged, 
we may then move to the next round of scrutiny: whether such 
agreements should be enforced.  As mentioned earlier, imperfections 
in the bargaining process do not require that a contract be held 
unenforceable.  However, the information gap in the pre-dispute 
context provides a significant reason for subjecting pre-dispute 
agreements to an unconscionability analysis.  Interestingly, courts 
which find such agreements to be unconscionable have not focused 
on the information gap, relying instead on such concepts as unequal 
bargaining power and contracts of adhesion.189  A deeper 
understanding of the information gap would make these terms less 
of a place-holder and provide stronger grounds for a finding of 
unconscionability. 190 
                                                        
189 Alexander v. Anthony Intl, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 270 (3d Cir. 2003); 
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 
2002);  
190 Cf. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
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 Moreover, the existence of the information gap points to two 
directions for future reforms of the arbitration process.  One direction 
would involve greater scrutiny by courts of the terms of each 
agreement for its procedural fairness.  As noted above, this type of 
scrutiny is ongoing.  It makes sense given the information gap 
because employees have not had the wherewithal to police such 
terms themselves.  Moreover, standard requirements for arbitration 
agreements would reduce the information necessary to evaluate each 
agreement; employees would know that the agreement would at 
least have to adhere to a certain level of fairness.  A second direction, 
however, would be to require that more information be generated 
about the arbitral process.  Requiring published arbitral opinions, for 
example, would allow employees greater access to information about 
the quality of the arbitral forum.  The win rates for employers and 
employees for a particular arbitrator might also be useful 
information in evaluating potential bias.191  Perhaps employers might 
be required to provide a copy of arbitration rules and procedures or 
their own success rates in arbitration.  Information about claims filed 
against the employer would provide employees with a sense of the 
risk they have of needing to file such a claim.  As more information 
becomes available to employees, employers, and the counsel who 
work with them, the parties will have a better sense of the costs and 
                                                                                                                                  
that unconscionability be used to prevent purveyors of adhesive contracts 
from taking advantage of the market failure inherent in certain contracts 
relating to the salience of a particular contract term.  He argues that 
buyers make their purchases based on a calculation of the salient costs and 
benefits of the decision, but fail to account for non-salient terms.  Thus, 
sellers have an incentive to make non-salient terms inefficiently favorable to 
themselves.  Id. at 1243-44.  This approach has applications in the 
employment law context.  Employees, like buyers, will make their 
employment choice based on the salient features of the job, such as salary, 
health benefits, job duties, and possibilities for promotion.  The issue of 
employment arbitration is likely to be non-salient, thus giving employers an 
opportunity to make such agreements inefficiently favorable.  Cf. id. at 1234 
(discussing the non-salience of arbitration provisions in consumer 
agreements). 
191 Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. 
RIGHTS & EMP. POL. J. 189, 216-17 (1997) (discussing the potential for 
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benefits of arbitration and the wisdom of agreeing to arbitrate 
employment claims. 
 There are dangers to both mandatory procedures and greater 
disclosure.  Arbitration is attractive in part due to its flexibility and 
adaptability to particular environments.  Mandatory terms would 
restrict the parties ability to develop a system of arbitration tailored 
to their needs.  Similarly, greater disclosure would entail higher 
arbitral costs, as arbitrators and employers would need to develop 
and publish this information.  However, when balanced against the 
costs of unfair arbitration agreements, these choices may be the best 
available alternative.  Ultimately, we can hope that employers and 
employees will be able to engage in meaningful negotiations over 
arbitration agreements that are societally efficient and benefit both 





 If the ideology behind law and economics is about freeing 
people to make rational decisions about their own utility, then it 
would be in line with this ideology  perhaps counterintuitively  to 
hold pre-dispute employment arbitration agreements unenforceable.  
As I believe the foregoing models have demonstrated, employees are 
in a much better position to judge the efficiency of arbitration and 
litigation after a dispute has arisen.  Locking employees in ahead of 
time restrains their ability to make informed decisions.  To justify 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements, there has to be a reason for 
employees to be locked in.  Merely showing that arbitration in and of 
itself is cheap and fair does not explain why parties cannot choose it 
after the dispute has arisen. 
 There is a story to tell, however, about how pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements may end up increasing societal efficiency.  By 
shuttling parties into a (theoretically) quicker and cheaper form of 
dispute resolution, society may save money on judicial 
administration and litigation costs.  Requiring the parties to pay for 
their own dispute resolution provides them with an incentive to keep 
costs down.  And if we expect employers to pick up the bulk of this 
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all of their employees into a pre-dispute arbitration system might be 
the only way for employers to recoup the costs of creating the 
system.  It would be up to courts to require a combination of 
mandatory procedures and mandatory disclosure that would allow 
employers and employees to make informed, efficient decisions 
about such agreements.  Ultimately, further research and debate will 
reveal the wisdom of these possible paths. 
  
